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I. INTRODUCTION

Within the 1991 Colombian Constitution there is a tension between
cultural unity and cultural diversity. This tension is constituted by two
analytically distinguishable but practically intertwined conflicts of
principles and rights. The clash between the constitutional recognition of
the indigenous groups' diverse moral and political principles (some of
them illiberal) and the liberal Bill of Rights of the political charter
comprises the first conflict.
* Universidad de los Andes Law School.
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The tension between the constitutional declaration that Colombia is a
unitary state and the self-government and judicial powers granted to
aboriginal groups composes the second clash of political values. In this
Article, I will analyze the second conflict of constitutional principles and
rights, as well as the ways in which the Constitutional Court has attempted
to solve it. To accomplish this aim, I will first analyze the values that
structure the second facet of the constitutional tension. Then, I will
critically analyze the Constitutional Court's jurisprudence on aboriginal
groups' territorial autonomy. In these cases, the Court must balance the
principle that Colombia is a unitary state against the self-government
rights granted to cultural minorities. The analysis of the Court's
jurisprudence will be divided in three parts.
First, I will examine case T-428/92 (Cristianiacase),1 in which an
aboriginal groups' political autonomy, although a fundamental dimension
of the conflict, is ignored by the Court. Second, I will analyze case T405/93 (Military Base case) 2 where indigenous communities' political
autonomy is radically restricted and implausibly subordinated to other
constitutional values. Third, I will analyze cases T-257/93 (Vaup6s case),3
T-380/93 (Embera case), 4 SU-039/97 (U'wa case),5 and T-652/98 (Urrd
case), 6 where indigenous communities' political autonomy are supported,
although in some cases using paternalistic arguments.7 In the last section

1. Case T-428/92, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-859, June 24, 1992; Corte
Constitucional. Sistema de bdsqueda [hereinafter Constitutional Court, Search System], available
at http://www.ramajudicial.gov.co/csj portal/jsp/frames/index.jspidsitio-6&ruta=/j urisprudencia/
consulta.jsp (last visited Aug. 29, 2005).
2. Case T-405/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-12559, Sept. 23, 1993; Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
3. Case T-257/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-10.239, June 30, 1993; Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
4. Case T-380/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-13636, Oct. 14, 1993. Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
5. Case SU-039/97, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-84771, Feb. 3, 1997. Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
6. Case T-652/98, Corte Constitucional, exps. No. T-168.594 & T-182.245, Nov. 10, 1998;
Constitutional Court, Search System, supra note 1.
7. Case T-188/93, the seventh case decided by the Court regarding aboriginal groups'
territorial autonomy, will be briefly explored in a footnote. The only argument presented in this
case that is relevant for the issues analyzed in this Article is reiterated in case T-652/98 (Urni case).
This argument, the Court's declaration that aboriginal groups' have a fundamental right to the
state's recognition of their ancestral lands as collective property, will be analyzed when Urr, is
examined. See Case T-188/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-7281, May 12, 1993.
Constitutional Court, Search System, supra note 1.
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of this Article, I will offer some concluding remarks that will assess the
contributions and obstacles that the Court's jurisprudence has created for
the protection and strengthening of aboriginal authorities' selfgovernment.
II. THE VALUES IN CONFLICT
The components of the second clash of political values that constitutes
the cultural unity - cultural diversity conflict within the 1991 Colombian
Constitution are, on the one hand, the principle of political unity, and on
the other, the cultural minorities' self-government rights. The principle of
political unity is recognized by Article 1 of the political charter that
declares that, "Colombia is a social state of law, organized as a unitary
Republic... ." Cultural minorities' self-government rights are recognized
by Article 330, which acknowledges the aboriginal groups' right to govern
themselves by their uses and costumes and by Article 246 which grants
aboriginal peoples the right to exercise jurisdictional powers within their
territory.' Cultural minorities' self-government rights are also recognized
by Articles 287, 288, and 289 which state that aboriginal lands have
"territorial entities" status as provinces or municipalities, by the
declaration that Indian territories are collective property,9 and by the
obligation of the state to promote the participation of aboriginal
communities in the decision making process concerning the exploitation
of natural resources within their lands.'°
The principle of political unity has been traditionally interpreted as
stating that in Colombia there is one and only one legal system and one
and only one centralized and hierarchical political structure. Congress and
the executive power are the only entities with the power to transform
political decisions into law. All other government authorities have merely
the power to develop the legal norms produced by these institutions. The

8. The Colombian Constitution also recognizes other rights that develop and facilitate
cultural minorities' self-government rights. Article 171 creates the senate's special national
electoral district for indigenous peoples, Article 176 declares that the law can create a House of
Representative's special electoral district for cultural minorities, Article 10 states that communities
with their own linguistic traditions have the right to a bilingual education, Article 68 declares that
cultural minorities have the right to an education that respects and develops their cultural identity,
and Article 10 recognizes that the indigenous groups' languages are official within their territory.
9. COLOM. CONST. art. 329.
10. Id. art. 330.
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Colombian Constitution, however, also grants Indian tribes the power to
create law. Their legal decisions can collide with the legal rules created by
Congress and the executive power. Their traditions might require doing
things that are prohibited by the legal norms proclaimed by the central
institutions. Implicit in this conflict of outcomes is a broader debate about
the basic structure of the Colombian state. What should be the political and
legal relationship between the center and the periphery? What political and
legal powers should government authorities, at the national and the local
level have?
The Colombian Constitution clearly indicates that Colombia is a
unitary state. Yet, it also grants aboriginal groups' self-government rights,
indicating that Colombia is decentralized, and declaring its territorial units
autonomous." Do these statements mean, as they traditionally have, that
in Colombia the power to create law is concentrated in the central
government and that Indian authorities are just administrative instruments
in charge of developing, at the local level, what the center orders? Or
should they be interpreted as indicating that aboriginal authorities have the
power to create law as long as it does not conflict with the Colombian
Constitution and the legal norms created by the center? Or should these
statements be understood as saying that Indian authorities have a general
right to create law, even law that conflicts with laws and decrees created
by national authorities?
The tension between the principle of political unity and cultural
minorities' self-government rights is concretized with special strength in
the public debate about the content and limits of the territorial autonomy
rights granted to aboriginal groups by the Colombian Constitution. This
discussion is particularly important since it evinces the intertwined
character of political autonomy and territory. To exercise control over a
territory is a necessary condition for self-government. All legal and
political decisions made by any government authority would be void from
a practical point of view if there were no land in which to enforce them.
This is also an important issue because the 1991 Colombian Constitution
gave broad territorial autonomy powers to aboriginal communities. Thus,
the way these rights are interpreted by the central authorities will affect in
a notable way the more narrow territorial autonomy rights granted by the

11. Id. art. 1.
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juridical system to other cultural minorities, such as rural black
communities of the Pacific coast.' 2
The public discussion about the content and limits of aboriginal groups'
territorial autonomy has been particularly intense in the last thirteen years.
The Colombian Constitution gives Indian groups the right to determine the
rules governing the use of their land, the exploitation of natural resources
3
in their territories, and the transit and settlement of their Resguardos.'
However, the political charter also includes some important principles and
values that limit aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy. This right is
constrained by the constitutional declaration that the subsoil and all
nonrenewable resources are owned by the state, 4 the constitutional
recognition of freedom of movement, 5 and the constitutional principle
stating that private property rights can be restricted when in conflict with
the general interest of the polity. 6
The tension between aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy and the
conflicting constitutional rights can only be understood if the objectives
that each of these values pursues are made explicit. The principle of
territorial autonomy authorizes aboriginal groups to use their land and
administer the natural resources in their territories in accordance with their
traditions. This authorization allows Indian tribes to accomplish two
important, interrelated ends. It allows aboriginal groups to determine
autonomously their necessities and the way they should be satisfied, and
it allows the consolidation and reproduction of the groups' way of life.
Cultural traditions can survive only if they are regularly applied in the
public realm and if they are used to educate new generations. When
traditions are utilized to define the community's public life by determining
how to make use of and distribute their resources, its members learn or are
reminded of their content and can perceive their worth and vitality. When
the leaders of the community decide, for example, that its members can
only catch a specific number of fish in a sacred lagoon during certain
months of the year, they are not just applying the religious rules in which
the community believe. They are also consolidating their authority and the

12. See Law No. 70 of Aug. 27, 1993, in D.O. No. 41.013, Aug. 31, 1993.
13. Resguardo is a territory over which one or more indigenous groups have collective
property and where they can rule their private and public lives through their cultural traditions. See
Decree No. 2164, Dec. 7, 1995, art. 21 (articles 329 and 330).
14. COLOM. CONST. art. 332.
15. Id. art. 24.
16. Id. art. 58.
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legitimacy of the community's religion. Adult members of the group will
be reminded that the lagoon is sacred territory and children will be taught
that this is the case. Adults and children will be reminded of, or educated
about, the religious and political hierarchy of the group.
The principle of territorial and political autonomy also authorizes
aboriginal groups to establish policies regarding settlement and transit of
persons within their lands. This authorization pursues two fundamental
aims: to allow indigenous groups to control their relationship with other
cultures and to protect and reproduce their ways of life. Indigenous groups
are authorized to decide if they want to live culturally isolated or if they
want to interact with other cultural communities. If they want to interact
with other groups they are also authorized to determine the circumstances
and pace at which these encounters should be maintained. Indigenous
groups are then allowed to close their borders to non-Indians and are given
the powers to control the cultural, political, and economic consequences
that the settlement and transit of non-Indians within indigenous groups'
territory usually have. 7 Aboriginal communities are authorized as well to
apply their traditions for regulating the movement and settlement of their
own members within collective lands, i" and through this mechanism, to
give shape to the community's public and private life. In this way,
community members are continuously taught or reminded of the norms
that govern the group and the stability and reproduction of the traditional
culture are made possible.
The Article of the Colombian Constitution that proclaims the state
ownership of nonrenewable resources, however, pursues two objectives
that can be at odds with aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy: economic
development and economic stability. 9 The exploitation of nonrenewable
natural resources is fundamental for attaining these aims. Oil, coal, iron,
among other natural resources, provide energy or raw materials needed to
keep the economy moving, to fund its industrialization, and to generate

17. Examples of these consequences are the following: distribution of available resources
among a greater number of people, arrival of goods and knowledge that could change the way of
life of the community, and the nonrecognition of traditional authorities by persons that do not
belong to the group.
18. Aboriginal groups' authorities can for example prohibit the transit of the members of the
community over sacred lands and organize the settlement of new families in accordance with the
economic system of the group.
19. The principle stating the prevalence of the general interest over the interest of private
individuals, obviously, is applicable in other noneconomic contexts and thus, can be understood
as having other objectives.
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much needed income to pay for government's services and programs.
Colombia, as many other third world countries, strongly depends on the
exploitation of these resources for economic growth and government
spending.2" Any advance in the satisfaction of the necessities and wishes
of the population, and the redistribution of wealth required for creating a
just society depends on the industrialization and vitality of the economy.
For these reasons, the Colombian Constitution established the state
ownership of nonrenewable resources. The government, for the benefit of
all, should be able to determine the ways these resources ought to be
exploited and used.
The problem is that many nonrenewable resources' reserves are located
within aboriginal groups' territories and many of these communities do not
want them to be exploited. A few indigenous groups argue that the
exploitation of the subsoil is forbidden by their traditions, such as The
U'wa. They believe that any attempt to extract minerals from beneath the
ground would enrage their gods, threaten the stability of the universe, and
express disrespect for their cultures." Some other indigenous
communities, indeed the majority of them, claim that the exploitation of
nonrenewable resources within their lands would affect their ways of life
negatively, such as the Embera. The arrival and transit of outsiders
allowed by the construction of roads needed for the transportation of the
minerals, the large amounts of money brought into their economic system
by oil companies, and the destruction of hunting and fishing areas by
mining activities, for example, would destabilize communities and
endanger their cultural integrity.
Freedom of movement also collides with aboriginal groups' territorial
autonomy. Freedom of movement forbids unreasonable government
restrictions on individuals' right to travel and settle in any region of the
country they choose. In order to pursue their private and political projects,
individuals should be free to move around the country and to settle in its
various regions. Indigenous groups' authorities, however, have the power
to prohibit the transit or settlement of non-Indians in their territory. In fact,
many aboriginal communities consider the presence of non-Indians in their

20. Between 1996 and 2003, oil, coal, and iron constituted approximately 40% of Colombian
exports. Exportar,Colombia,ExportacionesporSectorEcondmico[Exporting, Colombia, Exports
by Economic Sector], availableat http://www.businesscol.com/comex/estexpOl.htm (last visited
Aug. 29, 2005).
21. The U'wa people's opposition to the exploitation of oil in their ancestral lands is justified
along these lines. See infra text accompanying notes 70-76.
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lands endangers the cultural integrity of their communities and threatens
their political stability (e.g., the Kogui, Arhuaco, Huitoto, and Muinane
aboriginal groups).
The cultural and political problems that non-indigenous religious
groups have generated in almost all aboriginal communities, Indian
authorities argue, are a good example of the situations that they want to
avoid by closing their borders to nonmembers. With the acquiescence of
the government, missionaries destroyed the links between many aboriginal
communities and their traditional religious beliefs. For many theocratic
aboriginal groups, this meant that their political leaders lost legitimacy and
thus, the stability of their political system was put in question.22
The principle stating that private property rights can be restricted when
they clash with the general interest of the polity is in tension with
aboriginal communities' territorial autonomy as well. The rationale behind
this principle is that the property rights of some individuals should not be
an obstacle to the realization of the polity's interest. The general interest
should prevail over the interest of a few. Aboriginal groups, however, own
24.5% of the land of the country and many Resguardos are located in
economically strategic areas or in regions where the guerrilla groups and
drug traffickers have a strong presence.23 The state then might need to
limit aboriginal groups' property rights in order to protect the rights and
freedoms of all individuals who inhabit Colombia and/or to promote the
economic prosperity of the country.
The political charter imposes on the government the obligation to
guarantee the security of all individuals living in Colombia so that they can
exercise their constitutional rights. Criminal activities, the fear that they
cause among people and the social chaos that they create, can become
serious obstacles to the implementation of citizens' rights. The state might
need to send police or armed forces to transit or settle in Indian lands in
order to control the illegal activities happening within them. However, the
continuous presence of law enforcement agencies or the army within
Indian territories might have negative consequences for the communities.
The arrival of a large number of soldiers, for example, might break the
balance of the fragile environment in which many Indian communities live

22. See, e.g., Case SU-510/98, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-141047, Sept. 18, 1998;
Constitutional Court, Search System, supra note 1.
23. Ratil Arango & Enrique Sdnchez, Los Pueblos Indfgenas de Colombia 1997 [Indigenous
Peoples of Colombia 1997] 223 (Tercer Mundo ed., 1999).
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and on which they depend, and might generate new cultural dynamics that
could negatively affect the cultural integrity of the group.
Similarly, the Colombian Constitution obliges the government to do
everything possible to achieve economic growth. Yet, the economic
stability and development of the country depend on the construction of an
infrastructure that allows the movement of persons and goods and provides
energy and other basic services to industries and households. The country
needs to construct roads, bridges, ports, and airports that allow products
to be moved rapidly and cheaply from where they are produced to where
they will be consumed and that allow people to move rapidly to satisfy the
demands of businesses and the job market. The country also needs to build
dams and power plants to guarantee a regular supply of energy that allows
businesses to function and to provide basic services to its citizens.
The economic development and stability of the economy further
depend on the exploitation of renewable natural resources. The nation
needs to exploit rationally its woods, waters, flora and fauna in order to
satisfy the food requirements of the population and to produce important
goods like medicines and paper. Many Resguardos are rich in renewable
natural resources and are located in strategic areas where the building of
infrastructure works would contribute to the economic development of the
nation. The use of the former and the construction of the latter would
probably affect Indian groups' cultures negatively. The building of big
infrastructure works, for example, might require the aboriginal groups to
leave their ancestral lands and the intensive exploitation of forests would
destroy the main source of food and shelter for many Indian communities.
The tensions between these constitutional values generate many
theoretical and practical questions, which can be divided in two groups.
The first set of queries arises from the conflict between aboriginal
communities' right to use autonomously their land and exploit their natural
resources, on the one hand, and the central government's ownership of
non-renewable resources and the right to limit private property rights when
necessary for the general interest, on the other. What should be done when
an aboriginal group disagrees with the government's decision to exploit
nonrenewable natural resources within its territory? What should be done
if the exploitation of natural resources owned by the state and necessary
for the effective functioning of the national economy puts in peril the
cultural integrity of an indigenous community? What should be done when
Indian land is necessary for constructing infrastructure that would benefit
a large number of citizens? Can the government legitimately impose its
view over aboriginal groups and construct any project on Indian land, even
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if opposed by the communities? If that is the case, what does it mean that
Indians are collective owners of Resguardos? What is the meaning of the
government's duty to favor the participation of indigenous groups in the
decision making process regarding the exploitation of natural resources
within their territories? What are the characteristics that this process of
participation should have so that indigenous groups' views are truthfully
taken into account?
The second set of questions arises from the tension between indigenous
groups' right to determine autonomously issues regarding transit and
settlement of persons in their land and the rights and principles above
cited. Can a non-Indian settle in an aboriginal group's territory without the
authorization of the community's leaders? Can non-Indians move through
Indian territory without the approval of indigenous communities? Are the
representatives of the central government authorized to transit or settle in
Indian land when necessary to comply with their constitutional or legal
obligations? Does the central government have the right to overrule any
decision made by aboriginal groups' authorities on these issues? If that is
the case, in what sense are indigenous communities territorially
autonomous?
In sum, underlying the tension between territorial autonomy and the
unitary character of the Colombian state, the priority of the general interest
over private property rights, freedom of movement and the state ownership
of nonrenewable resources there is a conflict of political and economic
ideals. There is a conflict between different facets of the ideal country that
Colombians would like to have. On the one hand, we value cultural
diversity and are committed to the principle of self-determination. We
want aboriginal groups to be politically and territorially autonomous. We
want indigenous communities to have the tools for protecting and
reproducing their culture and we want to remedy the many injustices that
the state perpetrated against them in the past. On the other hand, we want
our country to develop economically and are committed to the ideas of
progress and distributive justice underlying this aspiration. We also want
a united country with a stable democratic system where the voice of the
majority is heard, and where freedom of movement is protected.
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III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE TENSION BETWEEN
POLITICAL UNITY AND CULTURAL MINORITIES' POLITICAL AUTONOMY
In the last thirteen years the Constitutional Court has been the public
institution that has tried most actively to solve the theoretical and practical
questions generated by the tension between the principle of political unity
and cultural minorities' self-government rights. The conceptual framework
developed by the Court has determined the character of the public debate
about the content and limits of cultural minorities' political and legal
autonomy. This basic conceptual structure has been laid out by the
Constitutional Court in seven cases directly related to aboriginal
communities' territorial autonomy. In these cases, the Court most clearly
and sharply presents its interpretation about the second component of the
cultural unity - cultural diversity tension within the Colombian
Constitution. Unfortunately, the doctrine developed by the Court in these
cases has been inconsistent, and in some cases, conceptually unsound. The
Court's opinions present views that are incoherent and unable to solve all
dimensions of the conflicts underlying the cases.
In some of these cases the Court has also been paternalistic. The Court
sees indigenous groups as passive subjects that should be protected by the
government from the undue interference of external forces in their lands
and not as agents with the right to autonomously govern their territories.
The Court, in these cases, does not see a conflict between aboriginal
communities' territorial and political autonomy and other constitutional
values, but a tension between the state's duty to protect cultural minorities
and other constitutional principles. The application of which might harm
Indian groups.
Yet, some of the Court's opinions also present theoretical tools useful
for understanding and strengthening the rights and responsibilities of
Indian groups' territorial self-determination. From a practical point of
view, the Court's opinions generally have had a positive effect for
indigenous communities' territorial autonomy. Although sometimes for
the wrong reasons, aboriginal groups' rights have usually been protected.
The Court has confronted government and powerful private organizations
when their actions have affected aboriginal groups' rights negatively and
has ordered compensation for damages caused by their actions.
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IV. BLIND INDIVIDUALISM: IGNORING ABORIGINAL GROUPS'
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY

The first case regarding cultural minority rights ever decided by the
Constitutional Court was Cristianta(T-428/92). 4 The facts of this case are
stated below. The government's expansion and pavement of a road within
the lands of the Cristiania people (located in the province of Antioquia)
caused, at least in part, the destruction of the economic infrastructure of
the community. Landslides partially generated by the government's works
in the geologically unstable area where the Resguardois located ruined the
heart of the group's productive system (sugar mill, stables, corrals, and
coffee bean processing area). The government did not do the study legally
required to establish the possible environmental consequences that the
expansion and pavement of the road would have in the region. Briefly after
the action against the government was filed, the Court ordered the
government to suspend all work on the road until the case was decided.
The opinion of the Court was centered on the analysis of the tension
between the interest that the province of Antioquia's inhabitants had in the
construction of the road, given the economic benefits that it would bring,
and the interest of the indigenous community in protecting its economic
infrastructure and culture. The Court decided that the interest of the latter
had priority over the interest of the former and instructed the government
to maintain the suspension of the works until a study of the environmental
consequences that might be generated by the road was completed. The
Court also ordered the state to take all measures needed to prevent further
damage and to pay for the damage already caused to the indigenous
community.
The Courtjustified its decision with the following two arguments. First,
it argued that the interests of the aboriginal community and the non-Indian
inhabitants of the region were collective in character. Thus, the Court
added, the conflict to be decided was not between the general interest and
the interest of private individuals but between two collective interests:
Formally, this is a conflict between two collective interests, not a
conflict between the general interest and a private interest.... From
a substantive point of view this is a conflict between the interest of
the inhabitants of the coffee growing region regarding the
improvement of the area's transportation infrastructure and the
24. Case T-428/92; Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-859, June 24, 1992.
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interest of the Indigenous community regarding25 its property rights
over estate that is fundamental for its survival.
Second, the Court stated that the interest of the indigenous group
should be given priority because of its connection to the individual rights
of the community's members:
[I]t is obvious that from the point of view of the right in which each
interest is based, the demands of the Indigenous community have
more weight. While the interest of the Aboriginal group is based on
the right to property, to work, and to maintain its ethnic and cultural
integrity, the interest of the rest of the community is based on the
right to finish a construction work conceived for the economic
benefit of the region.26
The expansion of the road, the Court said, negatively affected the
individual rights of the aboriginal community's members, and the
continuation of the construction might affect them further. The Indians'
rights to life,27 private property, work, and the integrity of their culture
were all threatened or violated by the destruction of the aboriginal groups'
economic infrastructure. In contrast, the interest of the non-Indian
inhabitants of the region was related just to the general economic benefits
that the expansion and pavement of the road would bring to the area. The
Court added that the government could never violate the individual rights
of the citizens to satisfy the general interest of the population. "The norm
that establishes the priority of the general interest [the Court said,] cannot
be interpreted as justifying the violation of the fundamental rights of a few
for the benefit of the interest of all."2 8
In Cristianta,the Court faced, for the first time since its creation, the
difficulties of interpreting the tension between cultural diversity and
cultural unity that exists within the Colombian Constitution.2 9 More
specifically, the Court had to decide a case where aboriginal groups'
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. "ITihe loss of the estate where the community's primary productive infrastructure was
based, puts in peril the group's precarious conditions of subsistence and thus, the integrity and life
of its members." Id.
28. Id.
29. The Colombian Constitution was enacted in July 1991 and the opinion of this case was
issued in June 1992.
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territorial autonomy collided with the economic development of the
country. The Court's analysis focused solely on the tension between the
individual rights of the aboriginal group's members and the interest that
the non-Indian inhabitants of the region had in the improvement of the
road. The Court's decision in favor of the indigenous community was
structured exclusively around two arguments. The first argument was that
the works on the road affected the rights to life, property, and cultural
integrity of the aboriginal group's members negatively. The second
argument was that the general interest of the community could not be
achieved at the expense of violating individual rights. Individual rights, the
Court argued, are the shield that in a liberal democracy protect all persons
from the tyranny of the majority.
The liberal argumentation of the Court, seen in an isolated way, is
plausible. It sheds light over an important problem underlying the case and
resolves it in a just manner.30 Yet, the Court's focus on the individual
rights of the members of the Cristianfa people obscured the fact that the
government and the engineering company violated rights to which the
community as a whole is entitled and that can only be exercised
collectively. The Court's opinion did not address the fact that the
government and the engineering company violated the territorial autonomy
of the indigenous group. It said nothing about how their actions violated
aboriginal group's right to determine the way its land should be used and
the Indian community's collective property rights over their territory. Land
belonging to the Cristianfa people was used in the expansion of the road
without the aboriginal groups' consent. The group's view on the
consequences that the pavement and expansion of the road could bring to
the community's cultural integrity was not heard.3' It seems that if the
30. The practical results of the Court's first attempt to give content to the constitutional
provisions regarding cultural minorities' rights were positive. On the one hand, the Court decided
to stop the expansion and pavement of a road that was going to bring significant economic benefits
for an important region of the country, because of the negative consequences that these works had
(and could have) for an indigenous group. On the other hand, the Court's opinion ordered the
government and the company in charge of the construction works to compensate the aboriginal
group for the damages that were caused to its property. The Court then, in its first opinion on
cultural diversity issues, inclined the balance in favor of cultural minorities and sent a strong
message to the country: cultural minorities' rights should be respected and those who violate these
rights will be held accountable.
31. It is one thing to have a narrow, dirt road crossing Indian territory and another to have
a wide, paved road that will bring heavy traffic and numerous people to the area. If consulted, the
Cristianfa people might have agreed to the expansion and pavement of the road. However, the
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work on the road had not destroyed the productive infrastructure of the
community and individual rights of the community's members had not
been negatively affected as a consequence of this action, the Court would
have condoned the state and company's actions.
There are two intertwined reasons that explain the Court's decision in
Cristian(a.First, Cristianiawas the Court's first attempt to give meaning
to the multicultural component of the 1991 Constitution. It was
unanimously decided in 1992, only a few months after the Court was
created, by a panel constituted by Justices Ciro Angarita, Eduardo
Cifuentes, and Jos6 Gregorio Herndndez. The three Justices did not have
any precedent that could help them to interpret the facts and the legal
problems of this case. Therefore, it was to be expected that they would use
the traditional legal and political language to understand and solve this
conflict.
Moreover, it was to be expected that the Court would use individual
rights, one of the most important categories of this traditional language, to
interpret the case. When these legal and political categories are used, it is
easy to lose the collective dimensions of the phenomenon examined. This
is exactly what happened. The Court did not see that aboriginal group's
territorial autonomy was violated by the government and road-construction
company. The Court only saw that some of the individual rights of the
aboriginal group's members were violated, e.g., the right to property and
the right to life.
Second, this was a tutela case, and thus, a case where fundamental
rights are supposedly being (or threaten to be) violated. Article 86 of the
Colombian Constitution indicates that the tutela action can be used only
to protect Colombians' fundamental rights. In the 1991 political charter,
not all fundamental rights are individual rights. There are some social
entitlements that are also considered fundamental, such as children's right
to health. Yet, the majority of them are in fact individual rights. Thus, it
was probable that the Court focused on the individual rights and not on the
collective rights dimension of the case.

community might have disagreed, given the increased contact with the dominant culture that these
construction works imply.
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V. MILITANT CENTRALISM: REJECTING ABORIGINAL GROUPS'
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY

While indigenous communities' territorial rights were ignored but not
undermined in Cristiania,in the Military Base case,32 aboriginal groups'
territorial self-determination was radically and unjustly restricted. In the
facts of this case, the national government constructed a military base in
the territory of the Huitoto and Muinane aboriginal communities. The base
hosts a group of U.S. and Colombian soldiers in charge of managing a
radar device for controlling drug-trafficking-related activities. The Indian
groups claimed that the construction of the base was undertaken without
prior consultation. The government, however, alleged it did inform the
Huitoto and Muinane about the construction of the base and that some
members of the community accepted work on the construction.
The indigenous groups also argued that the base was built on one of
their sacred sites. Since these places purify the environment, Indian leaders
added, the violation of the sacred site caused negative environmental
changes that affected the health of the population that lives in the region.3 3
The Huitoto and Muinane also claimed that the construction of the base in
their territory caused damage to the Resguardo's infrastructure and
ecosystem. The military's intense use of the Resguardo'sairport and the
road that goes from this place to the town of Araracuara seriously damaged
these transport facilities. The fact that a significant number of persons
were living in the base also created problems related to the disposal of
waste and the management of natural resources like water and forests in
the Resguardo.
The Court's opinion in Military Base focused on solving the tension
between what it called "two general interests:" national security, such as
the protection of the Colombian state from internal and external threats,
and indigenous communities' cultural integrity. The Court decided that in
32. Case T-405/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-12559, Sept. 23, 1993.
33.
[W]ith the installation of the radar device, the community has suffered numerous
injuries.... [Ilt has not been able to develop its cosmogony given that the radar
device is located in a sacred plae.... [The negative consequences generated by
the radar device] can be seen in the unbalance of the environment that creates the
epidemics that the members of the community are suffering.... [flor us, sacred
sites purify the air.
Id. (comment of some of the aboriginal groups' leaders cited in the opinion of the Court).
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this case national security should prevail over Indians' rights. The Court
justified its decision with the following arguments. First, indigenous
groups' collective property over their lands is not an absolute right.
Property rights can be restricted when public order issues are at stake.
Second, the principle of national security prevails over the indigenous
community right to protect the integrity of its culture. The military station
allows the control of drug-trafficking-related activities that affect all
citizens, while the protection of the Huitoto and Muinane culture affects
them only. For the Court,
Formally this is a conflict between two collective interests, not
a conflict between a particular and a general interest. Both
collective interests have differences regarding their grade of
generality. The aboriginal group's interest is clearly limited in a
spatial and temporal ambit; the Colombian state's interest is related
to the control of drug trafficking in the Amazon and low Caqueti
region and the security of the Colombian population.... The latter
is then, an interest that includes a greater number of persons, and it
could be said that within this number of persons the Middle
Amazon indigenous community is included.34
The Court also said that while the aboriginal groups' interest is based
in the right to property and the protection of its cultural integrity, the
interest of the state is based in its duty to protect the rights and freedoms
of all Colombians:
While the interest [of the indigenous communities] is based in the
right to property and to maintain its cultural and ethnic integrity, the
interest of the people of Colombia and in particular the interest of
the state is based and supported by the government's [duty to
protect] national sovereignty, to control the public order and to
guarantee the security of all the inhabitants of Colombia.. ..
Third, no fundamental rights were violated by the construction of the
base, although it was built in Indian's sacred territory. The Court explicitly
said that "given that [the radar device's] strategic location is essential for

34. Id.
35. Id.
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activities of control, it cannot be thought that the radar device violates
fundamental rights that should be protected through the tutela action, even
though for the Indigenous community the place where it is located is
sacred."36 Fourth, the government did discuss the project with aboriginal
communities; the fact that some of its members worked on the
construction of the base proved that the community was not opposed to its
building. The Court said that,
The installation of the radar device, as can be deduced from the
reading of the case's file, was accepted by the Aboriginal
community before its actual installation, even though it was
subsequently argued that the obligation to consult about this project
that directly affected the Aboriginal community was not satisfied.
Before the installation there were meetings with the Aboriginal
community and Indians worked in the preparation of the area and
in the installation of the radar device. Thus, it should be deduced
that if the members of the Indigenous groups helped in37 the
installation [of the radar device] they were not opposed to it.
Fifth, Colombia is a unitary republic. The creation of law is the
exclusive power of Congress and the national government. The indigenous
groups are instruments that can only apply or develop Congress's or the
central government's decisions. For the Court, Colombians
are governed, as it is affirmed by article 1 of the Constitution, by a
state that is organized "as a unitary Republic, decentralized and
with autonomy of its territorial entities." This system of articulation
of power in the territorial sphere implies that political decisions and
law are the monopoly of the central State, of Congress -in the best
of cases- or the government ... . [C]onsequently, any alternative
source for the production of law is excluded and local instances
appear only as neutral instruments of the central power.38
The Court, however, found that the activities of the soldiers that lived
on the base did affect the environment and the infrastructure of the
Resguardo negatively. As a result, the Court ordered the government to
36. Id.
37. Case T-405/95, Corte Constitucional.
38. Id.
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create an intercultural committee that would be in charge of preparing a
plan for managing natural resources within Indian lands.
The Court's decision in this case is justified by four arguments: First,
it held that the Huitoto and Muinane agreed to the construction of the base
and therefore the communities' property rights were not violated. The
Court decided then that consent was the first criterion that should be
applied to solve Military Base. From the Court's holding, the Huitoto and
Muinane exercised the collective property right that they have over their
Resguardo.For the Court, these aboriginal communities voluntarily ceded
to a third party (the Colombian state) the use of a portion of their land as all property owners have the right to do.
Yet, the Court's ruling did not contain evidence to support the Court's
holding. The Court just held that the government organized some meetings
where members of the Huitoto and Muinane communities participated and
that some members of the community worked on the installation of the
radar device. The scope of the Court's order did not contain anything
about who participated, what was specifically discussed, or what was the
purpose of these meetings. Were these meetings organized to inform the
communities about a project that was going to be done in their lands?
Were they organized to ask for the communities' permission to install the
radar device? Were the communities' authorities at the meetings? If that
is the case, what did they say about the construction of the base in their
territory? Did they oppose the project? If the communities agreed, why did
they change their mind and sue the government?
The only evidence available in the case shows that the government
merely informed the aboriginal groups that a radar device was going to be
installed in their territory and that the Huitoto and Muinane disagreed with
the whole project. In a memo cited by the Court, the Ministry of Defense
said that the state informed aboriginal groups about the construction of the
military base and the benefits that this project would bring to the region.
In this memo, the Ministry said that
The [radar device's] installation and functioning operations were
known by the Indigenous communities at the relevant time....
[T]he benefits for the communities were also explained to them. We
made them realize that the infrastructure and the improvements in
the runway would be left to the community since the radar device
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is mobile and the military personnel would stay in the area only
transitorily. ... "
The memo also said that, "[tihe national security and sovereignty 'have
4°
priority over the transitory hassles caused to the Indigenous groups.
The director of a semi-public foundation that works in the Resguardo,
also cited by the Court, said that among the negative effects generated by
the radar device's installation was the malaise generated between the
Huitoto and Muinane because they were not consulted about the
construction of the military base. He said that with the installation of the
radar "the Indigenous groups have felt a presence that was not previously
consulted with them in a place that they consider of great importance for
their cultural traditions.' In the suit filed against the government, the
aboriginal groups' representatives specifically stated that the authorities
of the community were not consulted about the installation of the radar
device.
The Court's holding seems to assume that the fact that the aboriginal
groups living in the Monochoa Resguardo were informed about the
construction of the base legitimated the government decision to move
ahead with the project. This assumption is wrong. Aboriginal groups are
collective owners of Resguardos; they have the same rights, with the
exception of the right to sell the property, as any other landowner in the
country.42 Indigenous communities then, have the right to decide who can
transit and settle in their territories. The Constitution does not allow the
government to violate the property rights of citizens just because it
previously informed the owners of the actions that were going to violate
their rights. If the state thought that despite the indigenous communities'
opposition to the base, it was fundamental for national security reasons to
install the radar device in the Monochoa Resguardo it should have
followed the legal procedures for expropriating the land necessary to
accomplish that aim.
The fact that some members of the community participated in the
building of the base hardly shows that the community agreed to the
construction of the military base. The authorities of the Monochoa

39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. (comment of the Corporaci6n Araracuara's director).
42. The Court itself offered this argument. Case T-257/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T10.239, June 30, 1993.
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Resguardo are the only ones entitled to make any decision related to the
transit and/or settlement of non-Indians in their territory. The fact that a
group of Huitoto and/or Muinane worked on the construction of the base
at most shows that these persons agreed with the arrival of the Colombian
and U.S. military personnel at the Resguardo.43 There is no evidence that
the individuals that worked on the building of the base were acting as
representatives of the community. The Court's ruling would oblige us to
accept that it would be legitimate for Brazil, for example, to construct a
military base on the Colombian side of the border (on public lands) if a
group of Colombians work on its building. From the Court's holding, this
would be evidence that the Colombian state and all its citizens agreed with
the Brazilian government's actions.
The second argument that the Court's ruling used to justify its decision
was that the general interest of the polity should always have priority over
the interest of private individuals. The Court decided that while protecting
the indigenous groups' legal interests would affect only them, protecting
national security would affect all Colombians positively. Without a
minimum level of stability and order, the Court's holding added, the rights
and freedoms of people (Indians and non-Indians) would be just empty
concepts. If the state were not able to control the widespread violence and
corruption that drug trafficking has generated in Colombia its citizens
would not be able to exercise their rights and freedoms. Although
aboriginal groups' rights to property and cultural integrity are important
for the polity, in this case they should be notably restricted.
There is no doubt that national security is an important political value
and that the control of drug trafficking activities that the radar device
allows contributes to its protection. Yet, it is not clear why this value needs
to be protected through the encroachment of aboriginal groups' rights.
There is no evidence in the case indicating that the military base had to be
constructed in Indian lands. Could it have been constructed at another site?
If to protect national security it was absolutely necessary to construct the
43. We can imagine other reasons that might have motivated some members of the Huitoto
and Muinane communities to work in the construction of the base. They might have been nontraditional members of the community and might have thought that the arrival of the armed forces
was going to help the community to move away from questionable customs. To help in the
construction of the base was for these nontraditional members of the group to help their community
to move in the right cultural direction. Another reason that might explain why a group of Huitoto
and Muinane worked in the construction of the base is the bad economic situation that they were
(and are) living with; the money paid by the armed forces might have tempted some of them to
work in the installation of the radar device.
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base in the Huitoto and Muinane territory, why was it constructed
precisely on an area considered sacred by these aboriginal groups? There
is no information available in the case that answers this last question, but
it is highly unlikely that within the Resguardo there was no other piece of
land that would have been appropriate. It might have been the case that the
location of the base was chosen for logistical reasons, e.g., since the base
is right next to the runway of the region's airport this probably facilitates
the arrival of supplies and the mobility of the military personnel. However,
these logistical justifications can hardly be seen as reasons powerful
enough to violate the sacred lands of the peoples that inhabit the
Monochoa Resguardo.
The third argument offered in the Court's ruling was to justify its
decision that national security should be a priority over aboriginal groups'
rights because the location of the base did not violate any of the Indian
communities' fundamental rights. The Court held that the location of the
radar device "neither harms nor ignores the ethnic or cultural rights of the
Aboriginal group, nor does it endanger the conditions that allow the group
to exist, nor the integrity or the life of its members."' In the Court's order
there is no evidence that the base negatively impacted the rights of the
Huitoto and Muinane. The Court's decision is implausible. The fact that
the military base is located in the aboriginal groups' sacred lands is in
itself a violation of freedom of religion. The Huitoto and Muinane's right
to practice their religious views was violated by the desecration of their
lands.
Practicing a creed, involves defining what is sacred, what conduct is
allowed toward the sacred, what consequences follow from the violation
of these rules, and the actual practice of these rules by the faithful and their
religious leaders. The location of the military base made the Huitoto and
Muinane's religious rules about the sacred inapplicable. These aboriginal
communities believe that nobody should live in sacred lands since they
maintain the balance of the environment. They also believe that any
violation of this rule would generate changes in the environment that
would bring negative consequences for human beings. Consequently, the
presence of military personnel in holy lands has meant for the Huitoto and
Muinane the arrival of diseases in their territory and the impossibility of
performing any personal or collective religious ceremony in these lands.4 5
44. Case T-405/93, Corte Constitucional.
45. The Huitoto and Muinane's religious beliefs might seem unattractive by many in the
dominant culture. The connection between illnesses and sacred lands might look unreasonable to
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The installation of the radar device in the Huitoto and Muinane's holy
lands also violates the constitutional principle that recognizes cultural
diversity. This principle entails the recognition of cultural minorities' ways
of life. It implies then that cultural communities' have the right to organize
their public and private institutions through their traditions and that the
state should respect the worldviews of the various communities that
inhabit the country. The government's violation of the Huitoto and
Muinane's freedom of religion is also a violation of their right to live in
accordance with their traditions. When the state violated the Indian
communities' right to practice their creed, the state also violated their right
to express their cultural difference. Religion is a fundamental element of
these aboriginal groups' personal and collective identities. It is an essential
component of their cosmogony.'
The last argument that the Court's holding makes to justify its decision
is that Colombia is a unitary republic. From the Court's order, this means
that the central state has a monopoly over the creation of law and that all
other authorities in the country should only implement or develop the legal
norms created by Congress and the president. In the Court's ruling on
article 1 of the Colombian Constitution, indigenous communities do not
have the right autonomously to create and implement legal norms that
reflect their cultural traditions. In this view, Indian authorities are mere
instruments of the central government. Although they have certain
freedoms on the margins, e.g., to decide fishing and hunting rules, their
main task is to enforce at the local level what the national Congress and
the president have already decided for the whole country.
Implied from the Court's decision on the Colombian Constitution there
is the modem idea that stability and order cannot be achieved without the
centralization and homogenization of law. From this perspective, there

them. However, the reasonableness of persons' religious beliefs should not be relevant for deciding
if the state violated their religious freedom through a specific action. These indigenous groups do
not want to impose their religious views over all Colombians. They just want to be able to live in
accordance to their religious traditions.
46. The government would have never constructed a military base on lands sacred to the
Catholic majority. The state would have never dared to install a radar device in, for example, a
place where a historic church was once built or on a site where it is believed that the Virgin Mary
appeared. On the one hand, the majority of government officials are Catholic and most probably
would not take the first step to desecrate the sacred symbols of their faith. On the other hand, even
if the government would be willing to do it, the opposition of the Catholic majority of the country
would have made it politically impossible. Yet, one cannot but wonder what would the Court have
decided if this had happened.
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should be one and only one legal system to avoid the disintegration of the
state. If there were various legal systems this would mean the existence of
various sources of power and the continuous possibility of struggles
among them. This central structure would guarantee law's coherence and
rationality as well. Law should be created by the same entity (or group of
entities) to minimize the risks of internal contradictions and voids. The
centralization of law would also guarantee the general and abstract
character of legal rules as well as their equal enforcement in all areas of
the country. All persons would have the same rights and all laws would be
in principle applicable in all of the state's territory. The central powers
would create laws, which provincial, as well as local authorities, would
contribute to those laws' enforcement. The possibility of various legal
systems coexisting within a country is thereby ruled out. Without
centralization, there would be conflicts of competence, laws that favor
individuals living in certain areas or belonging to certain groups, and
individuals uninformed about the rules that should guide their conducts.
The Court's order trivializes cultural diversity within its ruling on
Article 1 of the Colombian Constitution. In the Court's holding, the
constitutional recognition of the various cultural traditions that coexist in
the country means that the state recognizes all traditions that do not
conflict with the dominant culture. Since the hegemonic cultural tradition
controls Congress and the executive power, the institutions that hold the
monopoly for the creation of law, cultural minorities are condemned to be
eternal appendages of the majority. They would have no other mission but
to implement what the majority decides. Aboriginal groups would be
allowed to dress, dance and eat differently, for example, but they would
not be able to apply any cultural tradition that conflicts with the values of
the majority. In the Court's finding in the Colombian Constitution, Indian
lands are simply another territorial entity like provinces and
municipalities. Aboriginal groups' territories are just one more
administrative division designed to facilitate the enforcement of the
decisions taken by the central state. Indian lands and authorities are
nothing but a marginal piece in a bureaucratic structure that is meant to
communicate and apply in the periphery decisions made by the center.
The political and territorial self-determination granted to Indian groups
by the 1991 Colombian Constitution, however, was specifically designed
to break this modem way of understanding law and to temper the power
that the central state and the majority usually have in the life of minorities.
These rights were granted to indigenous communities so that they could
protect and reproduce their cultures; so they could design private and
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public institutions in accordance with their traditions. The recognition of
diverse legal systems by the charter is a necessary consequence of the
constitutional recognition that Colombia is a multicultural country,47
aboriginal groups' judicial powers,48 and indigenous communities'
political self-determination rights.4 9 These constitutional provisions break
the traditional monopoly over the creation of law that the central state had
for centuries in Colombia. Aboriginal groups, the Colombian Constitution
states, have the power to create laws, to enforce them, and to choose
political leaders in accordance with their traditions. Obviously, a system
that coordinates the various legal systems should be developed. Legal
pluralism is a source of innumerable problems and challenges.
Jurisdictional limits should be determined, areas of competence should be
defined, and minimum procedural standards, among many other things,
should be decided. However, all these tasks should be done in a way that
allows cultural diversity to flourish and not in a way that minimizes the
possibility of the expression of differences.
As a result, in MilitaryBase, the Court's decision radically and unjustly
restricted aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy. Indian communities'
collective property rights were extremely weakened, and the indigenous
groups' right to live in accordance with their traditions was drastically
undermined. In the Court's holding, the Colombian Constitution authorizes
the government to use, transit across, and settle in Indian territories just by
informing aboriginal communities that this would be the case. From the
Court's rulings, aboriginal groups are just instruments that the central
government uses for the implementation and development of laws created
by Congress and the president. From the Court's opinion, the only space
where aboriginal groups can exercise their autonomy is within the gaps left
by the legal grid created by the central state. Aboriginals can develop this
grid; they can even give it a local "flavor." However, they cannot modify,
contradict, or create an alternative to this system.
The Court's jurisprudential turn in Military Base can be explained by
the following three reasons. First, the Court's ruling could not avoid
addressing the challenge to the Huitoto and Muinane's territorial
autonomy rights. It was obvious that the construction of a military base in
the lands of these aboriginal communities was in tension with the
collective property rights that they hold over the Monochoa Resguardo. It
47. COLOM. CONST. art. 7.

48. Id. art. 246.
49. Id. art. 330.
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was also apparent that the construction of the base and the permanent
presence of U.S. and Colombian military personnel (supposedly) without
the Huitoto and Muinane's permission violated their self-government
rights. Second, the military base that was constructed on Indian territory
was an attempt to control drug trafficking related activities in the country.
Drug trafficking in Colombia is a national security issue. It is also the
main topic of the agenda of U.S. and Colombian relations. Within the
Court's opinion, it would have been politically very challenging to solve
this case in a different way. The Justices could have easily been accused,
by the Colombian and the U.S. governments, the media, and public
opinion, of obstructing the war on drugs and harming Colombia's
relationship with the United States. Third, are the political commitments
of Justice Herrera. Military Base was decided unanimously by Justices
Herrera, Mor6n, and Martfnez. Justice Herrera, who wrote the opinion,
was one of the most conservative Justices on the Court. During the nine
years that he served in the tribunal, his commitment to conservative values
like security, order, and legal, and political, centralization was constantly
made explicit in his opinions.50
VI. RADICAL COLLECTIVE AUTONOMY: BETWEEN A PATERNALISTIC
AND A JUST AFFIRMATION OF ABORIGINAL GROUPS'
TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY

From 1993 to 1998 the Constitutional Court decided four cases in
which indigenous communities' territorial autonomy was strengthened. In
Vaupds, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd, the Court provided some useful tools
for understanding the specific rights and responsibilities that aboriginal
groups' territorial self-determination entails. However, the reasoning of
the decisions was not always clear, coherent, or conceptually sound.
Particularly problematic were those arguments that offered a paternalistic
defense of aboriginal groups. In these arguments, the Court reproduced the
mainstream's view that aboriginal groups are weak and passive entities
that should be protected by the state from internal or external threats.

50. See, e.g., Case C-221/94, Corte Constitucional, Dissenting Opinion, exp. No. D-429, May
5, 1994; Case T-569/94, exp. No. T-48.344, Dec. 7, 1994; Case C-098/96, Dissenting Opinion, exp.
No. D-91 1, Mar. 7, 1996;, Case C-239/97, Dissenting Opinion, exp. No. D-1490, May 20, 1997;
Case C-481/98, Dissenting Opinion, exp. No. D-1978, Sept. 9, 1998; Constitutional Court, Search
System, supra note 1.
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The first case where the Constitutional Court explicitly affirmed
aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy was Vaups.5 1 In this case, Nuevas
Tribus de Colombia -

a U.S. Protestant group

-

quested the government

to revalidate the permission it had been granted to use an airport located
in the Resguardo of Vaupts. This religious group's mission is the
conversion of aboriginal groups to Christianity and it had been working in
the area where the airport is located for several years. The government
agency that administers airports denied the permission because the Vaupts
Resguardo's authorities informed the agency that the aboriginal
communities they represent did not want Nuevas Tribus back in their
territory. The religious group argued that the freedom of movement and
the religious freedom of its members had been violated.
The Court's holding centered on the tension between freedom of
movement and the collective property of Indian lands. It decided that the
latter should prevail over the former. The Court ruled that Article 24 of the
Colombian Constitution should be read that the law can limit freedom of
movement. It also determined that the American Convention of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights - to
which Colombia is a party - assert that freedom of movement can be
limited to protect the rights and freedoms of third parties. Finally, the
Court stated that indigenous communities have the same rights over their
lands as any other proprietor and consequently, that Indian groups have the
right to limit the transit and settlement of persons within their territories.52
For the Constitutional Court,
the property rights that an Aboriginal community exercises over its
Resguardo are rights ruled by article 58 of the Constitution.
Thereby, property over a Resguardo is a right-duty in the following
sense: a) For the owner

-

the Indigenous community -

it is a

subjective right that has the characteristics established by article
669 of the Civil Code .... [This article] establishes [the following]:
Property is a real right over a corporeal thing for its arbitrary
enjoyment and disposal, if this is not against the law or the right of
another person. .

.

. Particularly, the consent of the owner(s) is

required for circulating in it [the property]. Property is also a duty
51. Case T-257/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-10.239, June 30, 1993.
52. The only exception to this rule is that article 329 of the constitution states that
Resguardos are not commercially available. Indigenous groups are not allowed to sell their legally
recognized collective lands.
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because it has a social function. b) For third parties, it is a duty to
respect someone else's property. . . .and not to circulate in it
without the consent of the owner. In this way, the Aerondutica
Civil's decision of demanding the consent of the community....
for operating the Yutica-Yapima runway is justified in
constitutional and legal provisions as well as in international
treaties.53
In this case, the Constitutional Court strongly affirmed aboriginal
groups' territorial autonomy. The Court recognized the right that the
Indian groups that live in the Resguardo of Vaup6s had to deny the
entrance of Nuevas Tribus de Colombia to their territory. The Court
confirmed that aboriginal groups' own the Resguardos they inhabit, 4
acknowledged that Resguardosare not mere administrative divisions like
provinces and municipalities, and made explicit the content of Indian
groups' property rights over their lands. The Court declared that because
indigenous groups are collective owners of Resguardos, they have the
right to determine who can settle and transit their territory. The Court also
stated that the government and private individuals have no option but to
comply with the decisions made by Indian communities' authorities on
these issues.
The Court's reasoning is very significant if placed in a historical
context. Since being a Spanish colony, Colombia has promoted the
assimilation of aboriginal groups through religion. The Catholic Church
was the institution favored by the Colombian government to "civilize"
indigenous groups. 5 Yet, protestant organizations were also part of this
process. During the twentieth century, various protestant denominations,
such as, Jehovah Witnesses and Seventh Day Adventists, performed

53. Case T-257/93, Corte Constitucional (bold in the original).
54. COLOM. CONST. art. 329.
55. Law 89 of 1890 was the most important legal norm enacted in the recent history of
Colombia on these matters. Law 89 gave the Catholic Church the mission of "civilizing" aboriginal
groups in the country. To "civilize" Indian communities meant that their members should convert
to Christianity, learn Spanish, and participate in the dominant culture's market economy. To
achieve this aim, Law 89 put the Catholic Church in charge of the education of all aboriginal
groups in Colombia. It also gave the Church judicial and political powers over Indian communities.
Until 1996, when in Case C-139 the Constitutional Court declared partially unconstitutional Law
89, this legal norm defined the basic contours of the relationship between the state and aboriginal
groups. See Case C-139/96, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. D-1080, Apr. 9, 1996; Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
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evangelist activities in Indian lands with the approval of the Colombian
government. 6 Aboriginal communities were obliged to accept the
settlement or transit of missionaries in their territory and had nothing to
say about the activities that these persons were carrying out in their lands.
They had no other option but to accept what the central government had
decided was beneficial for them. The Court's decision made clear that
those days ended with the 1991 Colombian Constitution. The Court
affirmed that the government and the various churches interested in
converting indigenous groups to their creed, are autonomous agents and
thus, they alone can decide if they want to assimilate to another culture.
The Court's ruling that the rights indigenous groups have, as collective
owners of their Resguardos, are, with the exception of the right to sell,
identical to the rights held by any other landowner of the country that has
an important strategic consequence. This statement allows the average
citizen of the dominant culture to understand what is at stake in many of
the conflicts in which aboriginal lands are involved, because it suggests an
accessible way to identify with the Indian groups' claims. Members of the
dominant culture would be able to see that Indian groups' defense of their
lands is based on the same rights that any landowner claims over her land.
Aboriginal groups and landowners in the dominant culture can then
become implicit, or explicit, partners in the defense of Indian territories.
It is in the interest of the dominant culture's landowners to defend private
property. They would not want to see their rights to control who can transit
their properties limited.
The Court's holding exclusively focused on property rights for
defending Indian groups' territorial self-determination is, however,
problematic. This determination obscures the fact that the collective
property of Resguardos is not the only source of aboriginal groups'
territorial autonomy. These groups' control over their own land is not only
because they are proprietors, but also since they are culturally different.
The constitutional recognition of these groups' right to define the way

56. See CHRisTIAN GROS, POLITICAS DE LA ETNICIDAD: IDENTIDAD, ESTADO Y MODERNIDAD
[Politics of Ethnicity: Identity, State and Modernity] 146-50 (2000); DAVID STOtL, IS LATIN
AMERICA PROTESTANT? THE POLTICS OF EVANGELICAL GROWTH (1990). The evangelizing work

done by the Instituto Linguistico de Verano in Indian lands since 1962 was particularly effective.
This U.S. protestant group, with the state's approval, studied the languages of indigenous
communities all around the country in order to convert their members into Christianity. The staff
of the Instituto Linguistico learned Indian groups' languages to find ways of communicating
Christian ideas in a way understandable to the aboriginal communities.
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their lands and resources should be used and administered57 is based on the
constitutional recognition of the legal theory of cultural diversity. 58 The
Constitutional Assembly granted aboriginal groups' territorial selfdetermination in order for them to be able to express, protect, and
reproduce their cultural ways. To recognize cultural difference commits
the state not only to recognize in the abstract the diverse ways of life of the
various communities that inhabit the country, but also to create the
conditions in which these different ways of life can flourish.
The second case in which the Constitutional Court affirmed aboriginal
groups' territorial autonomy was Embera (T-380/93). 59 The facts of this
case are the following: A contractor of a wood company exploited 8.40
acres of forests within the territory of the Embera community over
approximately three years. Some of the Embera's leaders approved the
exploitation of the communities' woods by the timber company and
received cash, a boat engine, and a chainsaw as compensation for their
consent. However, the wood company did not get the government-issued
license that it needed legally to exploit the natural resources in Indian
lands, which are also a legally constituted forestal reserve. The
contractor's heavy exploitation of the Resguardo'sforests notably altered
the ecosystem of the area, threatening the economic viability of the
community.
The group has a subsistence economic system based on the exploitation
of the tropical forest that was endangered by the company's destruction of
nearly all the Resguardo'sforests. The state agency in charge of protecting
the environment in this region of the country knew about the illegal use of
the Embera's natural resources but did nothing to stop it. After the
exploitation of the aboriginal group's territory ended, this government
agency ordered the wood company to repair the damage caused by their
actions and to refrain from further exploitation of the natural resources in
the region without obtaining the necessary licenses. The government
agency also instructed the wood company to do a study of the
environmental consequences that its actions had and would have in the
region.
The Court's opinion was centered on the analysis of the tension
between the cultural, social, and economic risks involved in the
exploitation of natural resources in Indian lands and the special protection
57. COLOM. CONST. art. 330.
58. Id. art. 7.
59. Case T-380/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-13636, Oct. 14, 1993.
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that the government should give to aboriginal communities. 6° The Court
decided that the state's indifference towards the illegal exploitation of
natural resources within Indian territory threatened the existence of the
Embera community. Given the Embera's total dependence on the tropical
forest for their survival, its destruction meant that the community would
probably disappear physically and culturally. The Court then ordered the
government to implement all necessary programs to restore the natural
resources destroyed by the illegal exploitation of the forests within the
Embera Resguardo.The Court also instructed the state to pursue all legal
actions against the wood company in order to oblige it to pay the Embera
community compensation for all the damages caused by its actions.
The Court's decision was supported by three arguments. First, it stated
that the aboriginal group's collective property over their territories
includes the ownership of all renewable natural resources within them.
However, the Court also ruled that aboriginal groups should use their
natural resources with responsibility, particularly in areas where Indian
territories overlap with forestal reserves. Further, the Court ordered that
natural resources cannot be illegally, or arbitrarily, exploited; their use
cannot negatively affect the environment or any other common good or
political value. Accordingly, the Court declared that the approval given by
some of the Embera's leaders to the wood company actions was illegal:
The right to the collective ownership of renewable natural resources
within [Indian] territories, does not give the representatives of
Indigenous communities absolute power to decide what do with
these resources. Indian authorities' autonomy for administering
their own affairs, especially regarding the use of natural resources
(CP art. 330), should be exercised with responsibility (CP art. 95-1)
The ultra vires doctrine could always be used against [Indian]
authorities' actions in which the natural riches of their territory
have been used illegally or arbitrarily[;] [these actions] thereby
should be divested of all legal validity.6
60.
This panel should decide two fundamental questions. First, how to resolve, in the
light of the Constitution, the conflict between the exploitation of natural resources
in Indian territory and the special protection that the state should give to ethnic
communities so that they can maintain their cultural, social and economic identity.

61. Id.
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Second, the Court held that indigenous communities (not only their
members) are subjects of rights. For example, the Court granted that,
An Indigenous community is not anymore a mere factual and legal
reality; it has become a "subject" of fundamental rights. In this
case, the interests that should be constitutionally protected, and
defended as fundamental rights, are not only the rights predicable
of the members of the community but also the rights to which the
community itself is entitled.

.

.

.

[This is] precisely the

presupposition [underlying] the explicit constitutional recognition
of the "ethnic and cultural diversity of the Colombian nation" (CP
arts. 1 and 7). The Charter's protection of cultural diversity is
derived from the acceptance of different ways of social life, to
which the communities manifestations and continuous cultural
reproduction are entitled as autonomous collective subjects and not
as simple aggregations of their members ... 62
As subjects of rights, the Court also decided that aboriginal groups
have the right to live and not to be forcefully removed from their land. The
constitutional recognition of the country's cultural diversity, the Court's
ruling added, requires the protection of aboriginal groups' communal ways
of life and not merely the rights of the individual members of these
communities. This duty implies the protection of the preconditions that
allow the community to survive economically. In this case, the Court said,
that the means of protection of the forest that makes the subsistence
economic system of the Embera viable is that:
Among other fundamental rights, Indigenous communities are
entitled to the fundamental right to subsist ....

[This right] is

directly deduced from the right to life enacted in article 11 of the
Constitution. Indigenous communities' culture, indeed, corresponds
to a way of life that is synthesized in a particular way of being and
acting in the world.... that if cancelled or eliminated -

and that

can happen if its environment suffers a severe deterioration - can
generate the communities' destabilization and eventual extinction.
The prohibition of every form of forced disappearance (CP art. 12)

62. Id.
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The third, and last, argument presented by the Court's holding, was that
the state has the obligation of protecting environmentally fragile areas like
the forestal reserve where the Embera live. Embera is sustained by three
pillars. First, it protects aboriginal groups' collective property rights. For
the Court, collective property is no different from individual property.
Collective owners have the rights to use the land, to transform it, and to
receive the fruits that it produces (the classical rights given to all
individual proprietors: usus, abusus, andfructus).They also have the right
to decide who enters and transits their property. Second, as with other
owners, aboriginal groups have obligations with respect to their property.
They cannot use it in ways that negatively affect the rest of the
community. The Court reminds aboriginal groups that they cannot use
their lands in ways that radically disturb the environment. This issue is
particularly important given the fact that the Embera live in a natural park.
Their collective lands are also a nationally protected region due to the
richness of their ecosystems. Thus, the Embera are not the only ones who
have interests in their lands - the cultural majority and other cultural
minorities do as well.
Third, the Court grants a new subject of rights that concern the Indian
community. Its rights include the right to life and the right not to be
forcefully removed. After taking this position, the Court's ruling connects

63. Id. The Court also said that,
The close relationship between a balanced ecosystem and the survival of
indigenous communities that inhabit rain forests, transforms environmental
deterioration factors produced by deforestation, sedimentation and pollution....
into a potential peril against the life and the cultural, economic, and social
integrity of minority groups.... State's inaction, after serious damage to the
environment of an ethnic group has been caused - given the biological
interdependence of the ecosystem - can contribute passively to generating an
ethnocide.... [This ethnocide] would be the forced disappearance of an ethnic
group.... by the destruction of its life environment and system of beliefs. From
a constitutional perspective, the omission of the duty to restore natural resources
by the states' agencies in charge of monitoring and recuperating natural resources
(CP art. 80).... constitutes a direct threat against the Embera-Katfo community's
fundamental rights to life and not to be forcefully disappeared.
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the three fundamental issues of this case: property, the limits to its use, and
the cultural survival of aboriginal groups. Indian tribes cannot survive as
culturally distinct communities, if their collective property rights are not
protected. However, the collective rights that they hold over their lands are
not absolute. These Indians have limits, which means they may not exploit
their territories in ways that damage the environment.
The definition of what the legal problem is in a case determines which
facts should be considered relevant and which are not, the way the relevant
facts should be organized, the type of arguments that could be validly
presented, and a limited range of possible decisions for the conflict. In this
opinion, the Court's definition of the legal question to be resolved is
questionable. The conflict that the Court believed it should resolve
established a paternalistic framework for the analysis of the issue
underlying the case. The Court decided the problem presented was the
tension between the state's duty to protect aboriginal communities and the
risks that the exploitation of natural resources in Indian lands involves for
the cultural, social, and economic integrity of indigenous groups.
This way of defining the problem presents the Embera community as
a passive agent to be protected from the actions of members or
nonmembers of the group that might affect the community negatively. The
Court's determination reproduces the traditional view that the hegemonic
culture holds with respect to indigenous groups. Indian communities are
fragile entities, unable to protect themselves from internal or external
threats. The state does have a duty to protect indigenous groups. Article 7
of the Colombian Constitution declares that the state must protect the
country's ethnic and cultural diversity. Yet, the way in which the Court
decides on the problem shows the conflict only from the state's point of
view. It offers only the possibility of exploring the way in which the state
protected, or failed to protect, an aboriginal group. Embera is not only and not principally - about how the state should protect a cultural
minority from the actions of its authorities or the actions of members of
the dominant culture. The case is about defining the meaning and limits of
indigenous groups' territorial autonomy, determining the rights and
responsibilities of non-Indians, regarding the exploitation of renewable
natural resources in aboriginal communities' lands, and sanctioning the
persons or entities that violate aboriginal groups' rights.
Fortunately, shortly after presenting the legal problem to be resolved,
the Court's holding took an unexplained conceptual turn, focusing on the
limits of aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy. The Court's fundamental
analysis of this issue is plausible. Indigenous communities' collective
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property over their lands is not an absolute right. Although Indians'
collective property of Resguardos implies the collective ownership of
renewable natural resources within them, aboriginal groups cannot exploit
these resources with unconstrained freedom. They are limited by the legal
regulations that protect the environment and define the rules for
guaranteeing a sustainable development of the country. The message that
the Court is sending to indigenous groups' authorities is important. Indian
authorities have to exercise their power responsibly. In environmental
matters, aboriginal communities' authorities are limited not only by the
interests of their own communities, but also by the interests of nonIndians. The dominant culture has a legitimate interest in the protection of
the environment, particularly in biologically rich and fragile areas like
forestal reserves.
The Court's decision, however, has some problematic consequences
when applied to aboriginal groups whose Resguardos are also forestal
reserves (or any other type of natural reserve). The overlapping of Indian
lands with a natural reserve generates a serious conflict ofjurisdictions. On
the one hand, indigenous communities are constitutionally empowered to
define the use of their lands in accordance with their ways of life. On the
other hand, Indian lands that coincide with nature reserves are governed
by special environmental legislation that imposes severe limits for the
exploitation of their natural resources. The Indians' territorial selfdetermination then is notably limited by these environmental rules. The
Court's order assumed that this theoretical conflict of jurisdictions would
not generate practical negative consequences for aboriginal groups or the
environment. The Court concluded that the aboriginal communities'
traditional way of life does not present any risk for the stability of the
nature reserve's ecosystem. However, the opposite result is actually
reached. For the Court, the fact that the Indian groups are living in the
reserve guarantees the protection of the environment. The majority of
indigenous groups, the Court also stated, has a subsistence economic
system that does not use the environment excessively but rather guarantees
its sustainable exploitation.
The Court adequately describes the economic systems of many of the
aboriginal groups that inhabit Colombia. However, indigenous
communities might decide (forced by poverty or motivated by ambition,
for example) to change their traditional productive systems. A huntergatherer group might want to grow crops or an agricultural community
might decide to intensify its crop production or industrialize its economic
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system. 64 However, if these changes were implemented, aboriginal groups
would probably violate the severe environmental laws governing natural
reserves. The problem is not that aboriginal groups have to use their
natural resources responsibly. The issue is that the burden imposed on
Indian communities is heavier than the obligation imposed on any other
individual or community in the country. The strict environmental laws,
ruling natural reserves, may compel aboriginal cultures to indirect
conformity requirements culturally.65 Either they maintain their
subsistence economic systems, or they face monetary or criminal sanctions
due to the violation of environmental laws. 6
What will happen if new generations of Indians want to transform their
economic traditions? What if demographic changes within aboriginal
groups require changes in their production systems? If present generations
are willing to comply with environmental rules (as a strategy for getting
the state to recognize their lands, for example), are they not limiting the
autonomy of future generations? Is the Court not contributing to this
cultural freezing of aboriginal groups when it states simply that Indian
communities have to comply with all environmental laws, including those
regulating natural reserves? Is the Court not contributing to the obfuscation
of this problem when it declares that aboriginal groups' economic systems
are (and will be) compatible with the environment?
Once the Court ends its reflection about the limits to indigenous
groups' territorial autonomy, its decision analyzes private individual
responsibilities when exploiting renewable resources in Indian lands, the

64. The case of the Embera of the Alto Sind can illustrate this argument. Due to the flooding
of an important part of their ancestral lands for the construction of a dam, this Indian group had to
change their productive system from one based on fishing and the rotation of crops to one based
on sedentary agriculture. The problem was that the lands that remained after the flooding
overlapped with a national park. In national parks there are very severe restrictions on agricultural
activities. See supra text accompanying notes 59-69.
65. The level of pressure imposed on-aboriginal groups varies depending on how strict the
environmental laws applicable to the specific type of natural reserve are (e.g., Flora Sanctuary,
Fauna Sanctuary, National Parks or various types of Forestal Reserve). In some cases, National
Parks for example, the applicable rules are very stringent; in other cases, Productive Forestal Areas
for example, the governing rules are very flexible. See Arango & Sdnchez, supra note 23, at 235;
Reservas naturalesdel orden nacional [National Natural Reserves] (Raimundo Tamayo comp.,
Ministerio de Medio Ambiente), in Ecosistemas Forestales (last modified 18 Oct., 2004)
http:llwww.minambiente.gov.co/plantillal.asp?pag-id=753&pub-id-45&catid= 159.
66. See Criminal Code (Law No. 590, July 24, 2000, in D.O. No. 44.097, July 24, 2000),
Title XI, Single Chapter, About the CrimesAgainst NaturalResources and the Environment,arts.
328, 329, 331.
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supervisory role that the state should have in these cases, and the
connection that these two issues have with the indigenous groups'
survival. The ruling by the Court offers, regarding these problems,
adequately define and help decide the issue at stake. The Court ordered
that the wood company's actions in Embera lands and the failure of the
state to control them endangered the existence of the Embera community.
The Court held that since the survival of this aboriginal group depends
entirely on the rain forest, its destruction would certainly mean the
disappearance of the indigenous community.
The Court's reasoning makes explicit that the cultural and physical
survival of aboriginal groups is impossible without land. From a cultural
point of view, they would not be able to put in practice many of their
religious, social, and political traditions. From a physical perspective, they
would not be able to survive since their economic systems make them
totally dependent on what their lands produce. Since Indian groups'
cultures and economy are so deeply intertwined with their territory, the
destruction of the latter would mean the disappearance of the former. A
"river people," for example, would not be what it is culturally if the stream
that is its life's center is deviated for the construction of a dam or if it has
to move from its ancestral lands because of the government's forced
relocation programs. Moreover, the health and life of its members would
probably be harmed if this occurs. Their basic source of nourishment, fish,
would disappear, and the community would not have the know-how to put
in practice an alternative economic activity that could produce another
food source.
The Court's determination is valuable not only because it makes
explicit the link between land and aboriginal groups' cultural and physical
survival. It is also valuable, because, in contrast with Cristian(a, the
Court's opinion examines the collective dimensions of the conflict. What
is at stake is not only the rights to life and property of the aboriginal
groups' members, but also the right of indigenous communities, as
collectivities, to survive as distinct cultures. The constitutional recognition
of all ethnic and cultural groups that inhabit the country mean that neither
the government, nor private individuals, can take any action that can have,
as a direct or indirect consequence, the destruction of cultural minorities'
worldviews. Thus, any governmental program that can directly or
indirectly force the assimilation or generate the destruction of these
groups' way of life would be unconstitutional. Private individuals are
equally forbidden from putting into practice any action that can endanger
Indians' ways of life.
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The Court's holding, however, went much further and stated that the
Colombian Constitution, in Articles 11 and 12, granted aboriginal groups
the rights to life and not to be forcefully removed.67 This argument is
implausible. It is not clear why the Court needs to create two new rights
for defending aboriginal groups' right to live according to their traditions.
As the Court ruled in its opinion, the constitutional recognition of cultural
diversity entails aboriginal groups' (and other cultural minorities) right to
protect and reproduce their cultural traditions. There is no need to create
two new rights recognizing interests that are already protected.
More importantly, the Court does not explain how the aboriginal
groups' collective rights to life, and to remain in their original state, derive
from the individual rights to life and not to be forcefully removed.68
Articles 11 and 12 of the Colombian Constitution refer to human beings
and not to groups. Article 11 states that "[t]he right to life is inviolable
[and that] there will be no death penalty." Article 12 declares that
"[n]obody will be subject of forced disappearance, torture or any cruel,
inhumane or degrading treatment or punishment." The language of these
provisions, although abstract and general, refers to individuals only.
Collective entities (like cultural communities) cannot be put to death,
tortured, or cruelly or inhumanely treated, or punished. Similarly, in the
Constitutional Assembly Acts, there is no reference to discussions that
might suggest that these articles of the Colombian Constitution were
intended to be applied to groups of individuals. On the contrary, all
discussions about the right to life and the right not to be forcefully
removed were held within the debates about individual rights.69

67. The Court does not address the relationship between these two rights and individual
rights. What would happen for example if the individual rights of the members of an aboriginal
group's internal minority are violated as a means to protect the "life" of the cultural community?
See Case SU-510/98, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-141047, Sept. 18, 1998; Constitutional
Court, Search System, supra note 1.
68. The Court's holding does not seem to recognize the legal and philosophical problem into
which it strayed by giving rights to groups. The Court's ruling says nothing about the long and
difficult debate about whom can be subject of a right and more particularly if cultural communities
can and/or should be holders of rights. Are human beings, individually considered, the only entities
that can truly be subjects of rights? See, e.g., MICHAEL HARTNEY, Some Confusions Concerning
Collective Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF MINORITY CULTURES (Will Kymlicka ed., 1996); D.M.
Johnston, Native Rights as Collective Rights: A Question of Self-Preservation,2 CANADIAN J.L.
& JURISPRUDENCE 19 (1989); M. McDonald, Should Communities Have Rights? Reflections on
Liberal Individualism, 4 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE (1991).
69. See, e.g., Afda Abella et al., Informe-Ponencia,Proyecto de Nueva Cartade Derechos,
Deberes, Garandas y Libertades [Report, Project for New Rights', Duties', Guaranties', and
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However weak or strong the arguments used by the Court to justify its
decision might be, the order in itself is notably favorable for aboriginal
groups' rights. The Court granted the state to implement an environmental
plan for the complete recovery of the ecosystem of the Embera territory.
The Court's ruling also instructed the state to quantify the damages caused
by the wood company in Embera lands and to sue the company so that it
would compensate the aboriginal group. With this decision, the Court is
saying to the state and the dominant culture, as it did in Cristiania,that
those who violate indigenous groups' territorial autonomy will be held
accountable.
The third case, in which the Court strengthened aboriginal groups'
territorial autonomy, was U'wa.7 ° The facts of this case are the following:
Occidental of Colombia, a multinational oil company, requested a license
from the Department of Environmental Issues for carrying out seismic
tests within the territory of the U'wa tribe. These tests were part of the
process of exploration of oil-rich areas within U'wa land. Performing these
tests required the construction of access trails, some excavation works, and
the use of dynamite. In order to satisfy the constitutional and legal
obligation to consult aboriginal groups when the exploitation of natural
resources within their territories is being planned, the government
organized a meeting where representatives of the company, the state, and
the U'wa participated. In this meeting, the aboriginal community
Liberties' Charter], Gaceta Constitucional No. 51; Francisco Maturana, Proyecto Acto
Reformatorio No. 5, Propuestas de Reforma Constitucional Relacionadas con los Derechos,
Garantiasy Deberes de los CiudadanosColombianos[Project of Reform Act No. 5, Proposals for
Constitutional Reform Related to the Rights, Guaranties, and Duties of Colombian Citizens],
Gaceta Constitucional No. 6; Josd Matfas Ortiz Sarmiento, Proyecto Acto ReformatorioNo. 122,
Sobre la Cartade Derechos,Estado de Sitio y Fuerza Pfiblica [Project of Reform Act No. 122. On
the Rights' Charter, State of Emergency, and Armed Forces], Gaceta Constitucional No. 29;
Guillermo Perry et al., Proyecto Acto Reformatorio No. 84, Derechos, Libertades y Deberes
[Project of Reform Act No. 84, Rights, Liberties, and Duties], Gaceta Constitucional No. 24; Diego
Uribe Vargas, Informe-Ponenciapara PrimerDebate en Plenaria,Carta de Derechos,Deberes,
Garantiasy Libertades [Report, For First Debate on Floor, Charter of Rights, Duties, Guaranties,
and Liberties], Gaceta Constitucional No. 82; Alfredo Vdsquez Carrizosa, Proyecto Acto
Reformatorio No. 12, Reforma ConstitucionalSobre los Derechos, Humanos [Project of Reform
Act No. 12, Constitutional Reform on Human Rights], Gaceta Constitucional No. 10; Antonio
Navarro Wolff y otros, Proyecto Acto Reformatorio No. 50, Derechos, Garantlasy Deberes
Fundamentales,Titulo III [Project of Reform Act No. 50, Fundamental Rights, Guaranties, and
Duties, Title III], Gaceta Constitucional No. 22; Alberto Zalamea Costa, Proyecto Acto
ReformatorioNo. 34, DerechosyDeberesHumanos [Project of Reform Act No. 34, Human Rights
and Duties], Gaceta Constitucional No. 21.
70. Case SU-039/97, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-84771, Feb. 3, 1997.
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expressed its opposition to the tests, claiming that carrying them out would
threaten its cultural integrity. It argued that all objects in the physical
world were created and belong to their supreme god Sira. Natural
resources, the Indian group added, cannot be owned by individuals, and
should be administered following Sira's laws by the U'wa community.
As a consequence of the Indian group's opposition, the government and
the oil company agreed with the community's authorities to modify the
way the seismic tests were to be performed. The parties agreed to the
creation of an intercultural committee that would evaluate, and transform,
the project using two criteria: the protection of the cultural integrity of the
aboriginal group, and the technical and scientific requirements necessary
for executing the tests appropriately. The parties also agreed that the
aboriginal group was to be shown the exact sites where the seismic tests
were to be performed, and that a meeting, to discuss the conclusions
reached by the intercultural committee, would be organized.
The government agency, however, granted Occidental the
environmental license before the agreement was implemented. The
aboriginal community claimed that the license was illegally approved,
inasmuch as the government did not complete the process of consultation
required by the Colombian Constitution when natural resources are to be
exploited within Indian territory. The government argued that this
obligation was fulfilled during the meeting coordinated by its
representatives, in which all parties involved in the project participated.
Occidental agreed with the government and added that thirty-three other
meetings with representatives of U'wa, other aboriginal tribes, and
government agencies, were arranged to find the best way to balance the
interests in play. Occidental also asserted that the fact that some members
of the U'wa were part of the company's staff performing the seismic tests,
showed that these works did not endanger the cultural integrity of the
community.
The Court's opinion focused on the tension between the cultural,
economic, and social risks entailed in the exploitation of natural resources
within Indian lands, and the state's obligation to protect the cultural
integrity of cultural minorities.7' The Court ruled that the meeting,

71.
The first [problem] is to determine how to resolve within the constitution the
conflict generated by the exploitation of natural resources in Indian lands and the
special protection that the state should give to Indigenous communities so that
they can maintain their ethnic, cultural, social and economic integrity.... The
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organized by the government, could not be considered to satisfy the state's
duty to consult the U'wa about the plans to exploit natural resources in
their territory. This meeting could be determined only as the starting point
of the process of consultation with the indigenous community.72 Therefore,
it ordered the state to take all the steps to complete this process. The
Court's decision is supported by the following arguments: First, it
determined that the U'wa community is a subject of rights, including the
right to life. Second, the Court held the consultation process should be
considered a fundamental right, because that right is the tool which
aboriginal groups can use to protect their cultures from the negative effects
that the exploitation of natural resources within their territory usually have.
"[P]articipation through the mechanism of the consultation, acquires the
connotation of a fundamental right because it is a basic instrument for
preserving the ethnic, social, economic, and cultural integrity of
Indigenous communities and thus, for guaranteeing its subsistence as a
social group. 73
Third, because the consultation process is a form of democratic
participation, it should be done in good faith and the parties should
mutually respect each other. The Court also confirmed that the process
exploitation of natural resources in Indian lands makes the harmonization of two
colliding interests necessary: [On the one hand,] the necessity to plan the
management and use of natural resources in Indian territories to guarantee their
sustainable development, conservation, restoration, or substitution (CP art.
80).... [On the other hand,] the necessity to guarantee the ethnic, cultural, social
and economic protection of Indigenous communities.... that is, [to assure the
protection] of the basic elements that give Indigenous communities cohesion as
a social group.
Id.
72. The Court also said that the thirty-three meetings organized by Occidental with the
government and indigenous groups could not be considered as part of the consultation process. The
Colombian Constitution and the law clearly state that the consultation process should be
coordinated and put into practice by the government. The Court explicitly said on this respect,
the numerous meetings that according to the representative of Occidental of
Colombia Inc. have been held with various members of the U'wa community
cannot be considered or understood as [satisfying] the consultation process
required in these cases. . . . [This process of consultation,] undoubtedly, is
exclusive competence of the state's authorities.., given the superior interests it
involves.

73. Id.
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should provide aboriginal groups with complete information about the
project and its possible consequences. Indigenous groups should have the
opportunity to evaluate freely the advantages and disadvantages of the
project, express doubts and comments regarding the plan, and indicate
views about its viability. When an agreement between the parties cannot
be reached, the Court determined that the decision taken by the
government should not be arbitrary. The government's decision should be
objective, reasonable, and proportionate to the state's duty to protect
cultural minorities. The state should take all measures for mitigating or
repairing the negative consequences that its decision might have for the
community.
In addition, the Court held that when agreements or compromises
cannot be reached, the authorities' decision should not be arbitrary or
authoritarian; consequently, the decision should be objective, reasonable,
and proportionate to the constitutional aim that demands from the state the
protection of the aboriginal group's social, cultural, and economic identity.
In any case, all mechanisms should be taken for mitigating, correcting, and
neutralizing the effects that, in detriment of the community or its members,
are generated or could be generated by the measures implemented by the
authorities.74
In U'wa, the Court's order protects aboriginal communities' selfgovernment rights through a combination of old and new arguments. The
Court's opinion reiterates the declaration, originally presented in Embera,
that aboriginal communities are subjects of rights. Aboriginal groups have
the right to life, and not to be forcefully removed. These privileges are
endangered when the state assumes that the process of consultation
ordered by the Colombian Constitution becomes a mere formality. To
neutralize the government's position towards the consultation process, the
Court's ruling states that this procedure is a fundamental right. In this way,
the Court's decision creates a new fundamental right: a right of higher
constitutional importance that can be protected through the tutela action.
The Court's holding also states that the process of consultation should give
aboriginal groups complete, clear, and truthful information. From the
Court's determination then, these three arguments are all intertwined.
Aboriginal communities' right to life, and not to be forcefully removed,
can be easily endangered by projects aimed to exploit nonrenewable
resources within their lands. To protect these rights, the Court argues, the

74. Id.
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consultation process is a fundamental tool. In order to be effective, this
process cannot be an empty ritual. Rather, it is as a fundamental right
aimed at giving aboriginal communities all the information necessary to
make adequate decisions.
Nevertheless, the Court's opinion reiterated some of the arguments
presented in Embera. Once more, the decision by the Court indicated that
the tension to be examined in the case is between the state's duty to protect
aboriginal groups' cultural integrity, and the harm that the exploitation of
natural resources in Indian lands can cause to indigenous communities'
cultural traditions. Yet again, the Court presented indigenous communities
as passive agents to be protected by the state. The Court's determination
defined the problem in U'wa as overemphasizing the role that the state
played in the conflict at the base of the case, and the role the state should
play in its solution. Its holding obscures the real tension of rights
generating the conflict among the indigenous group, the government, and
the oil company. U'wa is not about how the government should defend
aboriginal groups. It is about defining the state's rights and obligations
when exploring and exploiting nonrenewable resources in Indian lands, on
the one hand, and the extension and limits of aboriginal groups' territorial
self-determination, on the other.75
The great contribution of the Court's U'wa decision is its declaration
that consultation is a fundamental right and a process through which
participatory democracy is put in practice. In this statement, the Court's
rule recognizes indigenous communities' right to participate in the
decision-making process that would notably affect their public and private
life. The Court's characterization of consultation, as a fundamental right,
is important for two reasons. First, the Court opinion acknowledges the
impact that the exploitation of natural resources in Indian lands can have
for aboriginal communities. Second, its order that consultation is a
fundamental right that allows aboriginal groups to use the tutela when the
state (and in some cases private individuals) violates or threatens to violate
this basic privilege. This legal action has become the only expeditious way
to protect the fundamental constitutional rights of Colombians.
U'wa is also a significant opinion, not only because it clearly indicates
that the process of consultation is not a formality, but also because it
provides a set of criteria to guarantee the purpose for which this process
75. The Court restated the idea that aboriginal communities have the right to life and once
more it did not justify how the collective right to life of Indian groups is derived from the individual
right to life guaranteed in Article I I of the Colombian Constitution.
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was created. Indian groups can control what happens in their territories.
The Court granted that those interested in exploiting natural resources
within aboriginal communities' territories should thoroughly inform Indian
groups about the characteristics and possible consequences of the projects
they intend to implement. Equally, Indian communities should have the
opportunity to express their views about the projects and to propose
alternatives to them. Finally, the Court indicated that all parties involved
in the process should act in good faith.76
The issue becomes difficult, however, if aboriginal groups disagree
with the implementation of a mining or oil exploitation project. The Court
said that in these cases the state could impose its view on indigenous
communities. Yet, the Court also indicated that the government's decision
about how to proceed in these situations should not be arbitrary but
reasonable, objective, and should take into account the state's duty to
protect aboriginal groups' cultural identity. The Court also determined that
the government should minimize the negative consequences that the
decision would generate for indigenous groups and compensate the
damages that the determination made might have for aboriginal
communities' life.
The problem with these criteria is that they give too much power to the
government. The government can impose its views over aboriginal groups
in all cases. What would happen if there is evidence that the
implementation of a particular mining project will radically harm an
aboriginal group's culture even if executed in the least damaging way
possible? How could this type of harm be compensated? It is true that the
Colombian Constitution indicates that the state is the owner of all
nonrenewable resources in the country. It is also true that the Colombian
Constitution only says that the government should favor the aboriginal
groups' participation in the decision making process related to any project
aimed to the exploitation of natural resources in their territories. Yet, we
should ask ourselves if we want the state to exploit its natural resources at
all cost. The exploitation of nonrenewable resources, no doubt, brings
important economic benefits for the country. But, should the state attain
economic stability and growth at the cost of causing irreparable harm to
some of its citizens?

76. The criteria offered by the Court were not its creation. These criteria were taken from
International Labor Organization's Covenant 169. This Covenant was made part of the Colombian
legal system by Law 21 of 1991.
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The fourth, and last, case in which the Constitutional Court
strengthened aboriginal groups' territorial self-determination is Urrd. 7
The facts of this case are the following: The national government declared
the public interest character of an area necessary for the construction of the
Urr I dam. The construction of this dam required the modification of the
course of a river that was essential for the Embera-Katfo's way of life as
well as the flooding of an important part of the collective territories of this
aboriginal community. The collective territories of the Embera-Katfo
overlap with a national park. The government granted the environmental
license to the company constructing the dam and authorized the start of the
first part of the project (deviation of the river and excavation works)
without having previously discussed the venture with the aboriginal
community. Consequently, the construction company - without even
contacting the Indian group - executed the first part of the project. Yet,
before the start of the second part of the venture (filling and getting the
dam started) the company agreed with the Embera-Katfo that they would
prepare and execute an ethno-development plan. The aim of this plan was
to study the consequences that the dam, had and would have, for the
indigenous group and to propose solutions for the problems that it had
generated or could generate.
Two years later, the government, the community, and the company
agreed that the latter would be responsible for funding and executing the
commitments established in the already elaborated ethno-development
plan. The parties also agreed that the company should improve and reform
the programs aimed to solve the issues that the dam's construction
generated for the area's ichthyologic resources (fundamental in the diet
and culture of the Embera-Katfo). The indigenous community demanded
that before the dam would be filled and put to work, the community should
be compensated for the actions needed to protect the forests and waters of
the area. The Embera-Katfo also said that they should be paid a percentage
of the profits generated from the dam. The company agreed to pay some
money for the former but denied any payment for the latter. The
community also claimed that the company should not negotiate the buying
of lands individually with families that live outside the Resguardo. The
community said that the authorities of the Resguardos were the only ones
who could legitimately negotiate with the company.

77. Case T-652/98, Corte Constitucional, exps. No. T- 168.594 & T-182.245, Nov. 10, 1998.
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Approximately one year after the agreement between the company, the
government, and the community was subscribed, the company requested
from the Ministry of Environmental Issues (which replaced the Agency of
Environmental Protection) the environmental license necessary to start the
second part of the project. The Ministry, arguing that the community was
not properly consulted about the project, denied the license.
The Embera-Katfo have traditionally been a community in which the
political power is segmented and diffused. The various communities that
compose the two Resguardos, between which the ancestral land of this
Indian group is divided, have their own forms of government.78 However,
to confront the challenges posed by the construction of Urrd, the
community centralized its government and created a Supreme Council.
Soon after the Council was formed, a power struggle between the various
communities that compose the Embera-Katfo exploded. Some of the
communities of the group felt that they were not appropriately represented
in the Supreme Council. These communities decided to create two other
Councils to represent them before the company and the government. The
company stopped all programs related to the ethno-development plan
because of this power struggle. The corporation argued that it did not
know who were the authoritative representatives of the community and
thus, did not know who was the valid interlocutor, with whom to discuss
the implementation of the ethno-development plan's programs. It also said
that the conflict should be resolved, and the legitimate representatives of
the community, determined in order for the company to continue with the
programs.
The Court's ruling established, through a judicial inspection, that the
works done by the company affected the life of the area's fishes negatively
and that the programs to improve the reproduction and movement of the
fishes in the region had stopped or did not work. Since fish are a
fundamental element in the community's diet and culture, their
endangerment put in peril the physical life of the members of the
community, and the traditional way of life of the group. The Court's
decision also discovered that the municipal and provincial governments
did not comply with their legal obligations during the process of
negotiation and implementation of the agreements reached by the
78. The Institute for the Agrarian Reform divided the ancestral lands ofthis indigenous group
into two Resguardos based on purely procedural matters. The government agency did not take into
account that the aboriginal community believes that its traditional territory is an indivisible whole.
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company, the Embera-Katio and the government itself. The municipal
government stopped providing health and education services to the
members of the group, did not answer various petitions presented by
Indian authorities, and retained funds belonging to the community because
of the power struggle among the various communities composing the
Embera-Katfo. For this last reason, the provincial government retained
budgeted resources that were assigned to pay for the indigenous group's
health services.79
The opinion of the Court was structured around six problems. The first
problem was that although there was only one indigenous group, the
Embera-Katfo, the government had created two Resguardos within its
ancestral lands. At the base of the power struggle among the various
communities that compose the Embera-Katfo was the fact that the group
was artificially divided by the government's decision to create two
Resguardos.The Court thereby ordered the government to unify the lands
belonging to the community stating that the government recognition of the
collective property of aboriginal groups' ancestral lands is a fundamental
right. Without this right, aboriginal groups would not be able to survive.
The Court determined that in other cases it
has reiterated the fundamental character of ethnic groups' collective
property rights over their territories.... [N]ot only because of what
property over the lands they inhabit means for the survival of
Indigenous and Raizales groups, but also because land is part of
Aboriginal groups' cosmogonies and the material substrate
necessary for the development of their characteristic cultural
forms.8°
79. Immediately after the Court agreed to examine the case, it ordered the company not to
fill the dam before a decision on the conflict was reached.
80. Case T-652/98, Corte Constitucional. In cases T-567/92 and T-188/93 the Court also
acknowledged the importance that the state's recognition of aboriginal groups collective property
over ancestral lands has for the physical and cultural survival of indigenous communities. In these
cases, the Court questioned as well the government's indifference towards Indians' petitions for the
state's legal recognition of their lands and for resolving conflicts related to them. In the first case,
two aboriginal communities requested the Agency for the Agrarian Reform to recognize the lands
they inhabit as a Resguardo.The government agency did not answer the several requests that for
more than seven years the communities presented. In the second case, two aboriginal groups shared,
as collective owners, a piece of land. Political problems for the control of the Resguardo arose
between the two groups and some members of one of the communities verbally and physically
abused in several occasions some of the members of the other. The community victim of the attacks
requested the Agency for the Agrarian Reform to study the possibility of dividing the land in two.
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The second problem was that the government and the company did not
discuss the construction of the project with the Embera-Katfo as ordered
by Article 330 of the Colombian Constitution. The company argued that
during the long process of planning and construction of the dam two
different corporations owned the project. When the environmental license
was requested and granted, the defendant corporation did not even exist.
When it was created, its representatives believed in good faith that the
previous company had consulted the Embera-Katio about the viability of
the project. The government argued that when the environmental license
was granted Congress had not developed Article 330 of the Colombian
Constitution (and thus, was not enforceable) and that the government's
unit for working on this issue had not been created. The Court dismissed
both arguments and ordered the company to pay for the damages caused
to the indigenous community by the implementation of the first part of the
project. Damages paid by the company should be enough to guarantee the
physical survival of the group's members while they adapt to the cultural,
economic, and social changes generated by the construction of the dam.
The Court's ruling asserted that if the company and the Embera-Katfo did
not reach an agreement on the amount of the damages, the indigenous
community should request a lower tribunal to determine the amount
necessary to pay the indigenous community a transportation and food
subsidy for the next fifteen years."
The third problem is related to the fundamental right that all indigenous
groups have to be consulted about any plan to exploit natural resources in
their territories and the development of the second part of the project
(filling of the dam). The Court ordered the company and government to
discuss with the aboriginal community the way the second part of the
project would affect the community. It also mandated that the government
and the company discuss with the Embera-Katfo the way the problems
generated by this phase of the project might be neutralized, the way other
problems might be prevented, and the way the company should

The state agency did not answer the requests of the community. See Case T-567/92, Corte
Constitucional, exp. No. T-3746, Oct. 23, 1992; Case T-188/93, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T728 1, May 12, 1993.
81. Once the company pays the amount determined by the tribunal, the Court added, a trust
fund should be created for the administration of these resources.
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compensate the indigenous group2 for the negative consequences that the
project will inevitably generate.1
Fourth, the construction of the dam obliged the Embera-Katfo to pass
from a "subsistence economy with low environmental impact to an
agrarian economy with less productivity and high environmental
impact." 3 Due to the changes caused by the building of the dam, the
Embera-Katfo are no longer able to pursue their traditional economic
practices: hunting, fishing, gathering, and rotation of crops. In order to
survive, the indigenous community would now be dedicated exclusively
to the growing of crops to be sold in the dominant culture's market.
However, because the indigenous community's territory overlaps with a
national park, it may not plant crops in the way required to survive in an
agrarian market economy. The Court held that the protection of the natural
reserve could not be done at the expense of the physical and cultural
survival of the indigenous community. Aboriginal groups, the Court ruled,
have the right not to be forcefully removed. Yet, it also decided that this
privilege should be balanced with the state obligation to protect
environmentally fragile areas (Article 79 of the Constitution). The Court
thereby, ordered the government to create, as ordered by Decree 622 of
1997, 4 a special legal regime to balance economic survival of the
community and the protection of the national park. The Court also
determined the company decide, with the government and the
community's input, the amount it should pay to make the Embera-Katio's
transition to an agrarian market economy possible.
The fifth problem is related to the recognition of the authoritative
representation of the Embera-Katfo. The Court declared that government
and company violated the aboriginal groups' right to determine their
political life autonomously just as they did not recognize all the
representatives appointed by the various communities that compose the

82. The Court stated that the company should pay attention to the serious damage that had
been and will be caused by the dam to the aquatic life from which the Embera-Katfo depend for
their nutrition. The Court asserted as well that the company should pay special attention to the
consequences that the flooding of the richest lands of the community would have for its capacity
to grow crops. The Court also ordered the government to provide health services to the EmberaKatfo to neutralize the problems that the community's members are experiencing due to the
environmental changes generated by the construction of the dam. Finally, the Court ordered the
government to register the community in the social security system and to give its members the
medicines prescribed by doctors for free. Case T-652/98, Corte Constitucional.
83. Id.
84. Decree 622, Aug. 11, 1997.
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Embera-Katfo, and when they stopped programs in favor of the EmberaKatfo because of the power struggle within the community.
[The] company and the authorities that have intervened in the
various attempts to solve the Indigenous group's internal conflict,
have violated the Aboriginal community's right to autonomously
solve its issues[.] Imposing a specific form of political organization,
assuming the right to perform electoral censuses, organizing
elections, and choosing which of the Embera's authorities should
be registered and which should not, are not activities within the
government or the company's competence.85
The government and the company, the Court also affirmed, must
recognize the institutions and leaders that the indigenous group wants them
to recognize. They cannot put pressure on the aboriginal community to
solve its political struggles in certain ways or to transform their political
structures. For the justices deciding this case,
neither the Constitutional Court panel, nor the Interior Ministry, the
Government of the Province of C6rdoba, the municipality of Tierra
Alta's Town Hall, the Multipurpose Company, the organizations
that wrote amicus curiae briefs, nor any organization or person
different from the Embera-Katfo communities listed above can
decide which are this Indian group's authorities. The Town Hall
and the Interior Ministry have been empowered by law only to
register the decisions adopted by Indigenous communities and to
certify what Indian groups want these entities' archives to include.86
The sixth and last problem is related to the indigenous authorities'
claim that the company cannot negotiate directly with the families that
belong to the group but live outside the Resguardo. The Court held that
Indian authorities do not have any power over people that live outside
Indian territory. Families that live away from the community's collective
property decided to break their links with the Embera-Katfo traditions.
Neither the government nor the aboriginal community can force them to

85. Case T-652/98, Corte Constitucional.
86. Id.
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reconsider this decision. These persons are free to negotiate with the
company about the selling of their lands.
To this respect, it should be said that the Territorial Council of the
Iwad6 Resguardo is an Embera authority with functions within the
Resguardo, but without any authority outside it. The Embera that
lived outside the Resguardo should be specially protected ...
inasmuch as they belong to a minority group and preserve an
important part of the traditions that characterize the Embera people;
but neither this Court, nor the Council, nor any other authority can
oblige them to return to the communal life in the Resguardo....
[Nobody can] impede these persons either to sell what is theirs
because the Territorial Council did not participate in the
negotiation.87
Urrdis a complex, rich case where the Court's holding presented some
new arguments useful for the understanding and strengthening of Indian
communities' territorial autonomy and reiterated some others that
accomplish these same aims. First, the Court decided again that the
process of consultation, which the government should implement when
non-Indians intend to exploit natural resources in aboriginal groups' lands,
is a fundamental right. As it did in U'wa, the Court made explicit the
relationship between the consultation, participatory democracy, and the
protection of aboriginal groups' cultural integrity.
Second, the Court held in Urrd that indigenous groups have a
fundamental right to government recognition of their ancestral lands as
collective property.88 This determination has great importance for
aboriginal groups. Historically, the state has ignored, delayed, or created
obstacles for satisfying Indian communities' requests regarding the
recognition of their ancestral lands as collective property.89 The state's
negligence has been very costly for aboriginal groups. Non-Indians have
occupied their ancestral lands, communities have disintegrated, and old
87. Id.
88. The Court first presented this argument in case T-188/93. See supra text accompanying
notes 7 & 80.
89. In Cases T-188/93 and T-001/94, the Court makes explicit the negligence with which the
state generally responds aboriginal groups' requests for the recognition of their ancestral lands as
collective property. Supra text accompanying note 80 (summarizing the facts of the first case). See
Case T-001/94, Corte Constitucional, exp. No. T-21908, Jan. 13, 1994 (for the facts of the second
case); Constitutional Court, Search System, supra note 1.
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traditions have been lost. As the Court said in Embera, aboriginal groups'
cultures are intertwined with their ancestral territories. Their subsistence
economic system depends on the particular characteristics of the lands they
inhabit and their cultural traditions refer, or are practiced in specific sites
within their territories. Without their lands, aboriginal groups have a very
slim chance of surviving as distinct cultures.
The Court's decision that aboriginal groups' have a fundamental right
to the recognition of their ancestral territories as collective property is
positive on two accounts. On the one hand, it holds that the state should
make every effort to protect this right. On the other hand, the Court grants
indigenous communities the power to use the tutela to protect this right.
This legal action is the most efficient resource that citizens have for the
protection of their fundamental rights: it is cheap, fast, and procedurally
simple.
Third, the Court's ruling solves the tension at the heart of this case
between environmental laws protecting natural parks and aboriginal
groups' self-determination rights in favor of the latter. Due to the flooding
of an important part of their ancestral lands and the deviation of the river
that was the center of their life, the Embera-Katfo's traditional economic
system was not viable anymore. However, since their territory overlaps
with a national park, alternative agricultural activities were radically
restricted. If the aboriginal group had complied with the environmental
laws regulating national parks, the community would not have been
economically viable. The Court's decision to order the government not to
enforce the Natural Resources Code but to put in practice Decree 622 of
1997' is of great importance. This opinion unenforced until UrrM, orders
the creation of a special legal regime for natural parks that are inhabited
by aboriginal groups. This judgment tells the government that
environmental laws should not be used at the cost of destroying aboriginal
communities. This, no doubt, should be the leading criterion for guiding
the government in the creation of a long-term solution of the tension
between environmental law and aboriginal groups' rights. Without a legal
regime on the subject this tension will not disappear.
Fourth, the Court's order requires registration and certification of
Indian authorities by the state. The Ministry of Interior is the entity in
charge of registering and certifying the legitimate authorities of all
aboriginal communities in the country. This process of registration and

90. Supra text accompanying note 84.
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certification has important consequences for aboriginal groups' political
and territorial autonomy. Only registered authorities are recognized by the
state. The actions of these "registered" authorities are the only ones
considered legally binding within and outside aboriginal communities. If
the government decides not to recognize a particular Indian authority, the
ability of the group to govern itself disappears. The leaders of the
community, for example, would not be able to receive money from the
national budget, and would not be able to discuss any project with
provinces' governments, and their decisions would not be legally binding.
If aboriginal authorities were not properly recognized by the state then,
they would not be valid interlocutors with the outside world and would not
have any legal power internally.
The Court's decision that the only role that the state can play in this
process is to register and certify the authorities chosen by aboriginal
groups is an important triumph for indigenous groups' self-determination.
Its holding ends the state practice of intervening in Indian communities'
internal affairs by deciding to register or not to register the political leaders
chosen by the groups. Indian groups are now free to pick their leaders and
solve their political disputes in whatever way they consider adequate. The
government is only empowered to keep a file that systematizes and
centralizes the political decisions made by aboriginal communities.
The declaration that Indian authorities do not have any power over
members of the community living outside the borders of Resguardos is the
fifth and last argument presented by the Court's opinion in Urr6 that is
significant for understanding aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy,
particularly its limits. Members of aboriginal groups should be able to
leave and break the links with the communities to which they once
belonged. Individuals should not be obliged to comply with traditions that
they do not believe in, or obey the decisions of authorities that they do not
consider legitimate.
The Court's determination that the energy company must pay for the
damages caused to the Embera-Katfo by the construction of the dam is also
noteworthy. As in Cristianfaand Embera, the Court held responsible the
corporations that violated aboriginal groups' right of self-determination.
Yet, what is notable in Urr6 is that the Court ordered the company to pay
the costs of planning and implementing the measures needed to provide
the present and future generations of Embera-Katfo the conceptual and
practical tools to survive in the new world in which they were compelled
to live. Since the situation in which the community is now immersed is
irreversible, the Court's holding made sure that the Embera-Katfo would
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have a chance to adapt to the new circumstances and, at the same time, to
maintain its distinct culture.
In sum, in Vaups, Embera, U'wa, and UrrM, the Court's decision made
genuine efforts to consolidate aboriginal groups' territorial autonomy.
First, it declared that aboriginal groups have the right to survive as distinct
cultures. The government, and private individuals, should abstain from any
action that endangers the cultural integrity of Indian communities. Second,
indigenous communities have the fundamental rights to have their
ancestral lands recognized as collective property by the state, and to be
consulted whenever there is a project to exploit natural resources in their
territories. Third, Indian authorities have the right to decide who transits
and settles in their lands. Concerning indigenous communities' political
self-determination, the Court also made a notable decision. Indian groups
have the right to choose their authorities and solve their political disputes,
in accordance with their traditions. Just as significant, was the Court's
determination to hold accountable the violators of aboriginal groups'
territorial autonomy.
Equally important, were the Court's decisions that defined limits on
aboriginal groups' right of self-determination. Indian authorities do not
have any power over former members of the community that live outside
Resguardos. Nor do they have authority to exploit their lands
irresponsibly. They have an obligation to use their lands in ways that do
not affect the environment negatively. In cases where there is a tension
between environmental laws protecting natural reserves and aboriginal
groups' self-determination, the Court determined that the state should
create a special legal regime to balance the values at stake. Environmental
law, the Court added, should not be enforced in ways that could endanger
the survival of aboriginal groups' cultures.91

91. Despite all their virtues, Vaups, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd also had some weaknesses.
In two of these opinions, the Court defined paternalistically the problems that were to be solved.
Aboriginal groups were presented as passive subjects and the conflicts at stake were viewed only
from the state's point of view, more specifically, from the perspective of the government's duty to
protect indigenous communities. The criteria provided by the Court to guarantee that the
consultation would not become a mere formality were also implausible. These criteria, although
appropriate to define how the process of consultation should be executed, put no limits on the state
power to impose its view over aboriginal groups when Indian authorities oppose the exploitation
of nonrenewable resources in their lands. Finally, the Court did not justify how the aboriginal
groups' right to life and not to be forcefully disappeared can be derived from the individual rights
to life and not to be forcefully disappeared.
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The turn made by the Court's jurisprudence in these four cases can be
explained by the following three interrelated reasons. First, the Court's
judgment is a honest attempt to protect aboriginal groups' self-government
rights. In Vaups, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd it is easy to see that the
Court's ruling takes aboriginal communities' rights seriously. From the
Court's opinion, it is clear that Indian tribes cannot survive as distinct
cultures if they do not have control over their territories. In these cases, we
see the Court's decision attacking, on several fronts, and creating various
strategies in order to protect Indian cultures from disappearing (creating
new fundamental rights, strongly reprimanding the government for not
complying with its constitutional duties, and creating clear limits to
aboriginal authorities' powers). Second, the Court's judgment was able to
protect aboriginal communities' self-government rights using legal and
political language that it is well-known and presents no theoretical or
practical challenges: the language of property rights. The main argument
the Court's holding uses in Vaupds, Embera, U'wa, and Urr6 to protect
aboriginal rights to self-govern is that Indian communities are proprietors
of their lands, and, that as such, they have the right to determine who can
transit along and settle in them. As proprietors, Indian groups also have the
right to determine how and when to exploit the resources within their
territories. Therefore, what the Court's judgment does is not fundamentally
different from the job that any judge would do to protect the rights of a
Colombian landowner. Third, the Court's holding is influenced by the
traditional paternalistic view that the Colombian state has held over
aboriginal groups. This perspective is that Indians are passive and weak
agents that should be guarded by the government from the dangers of
contemporary life.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS

In Cristiania,Military Base, Vaup9s, Embera, U'wa, and UrrM, the
Court's opinion goes from blind individualism, to militant centralism, to
radical collective autonomy. If the turns and twists that the Court's
judgments make in these six cases are connected, the path that the tribunal
created in the process of understanding and solving the tension between
the principle of political unity and aboriginal groups' self-government
rights can be made explicit. The Court's ruling started this process in 1992
by defending aboriginal interests through the defense of the individual
rights of the members of the Cristianfa people. The aboriginal group's
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collective self-government rights were never mentioned, although they
were at the heart of the case's legal problem. In Cristian(a, the Court's
holding was blinded by its individualistic approach to the case. The
emphasis that the Court's decision put on the rights to property and life of
the members of the Cristianfa people, did not allow the Court's
determination to consider the collective rights dimension of the conflict.
The Court's opinion in Military Base was an advance and a regress for
aboriginal self-government rights. This judgment was an advance because
it acknowledged that Indians' self-government rights were at issue. It was
a regress because it ruled in favor of the principle of political unity over
aboriginal groups' autonomy. The fact that the opinion of this case was
written by Justice Herrera, a conservative Justice, and that the case was
related to a national security issue, drug trafficking, determined the
militant centralism of the Court's verdict.
The Court's findings in Vaups, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd mark a
fundamental advance for the protection of aboriginal groups' selfgovernment rights. Although some of the Court's conclusions had a
paternalistic tone, they gave priority to Indian groups' political autonomy
rights over the political unity principle. This development was possible,
fundamentally, because the Court's ruling had at hand a well-known legal
and political category to interpret aboriginal rights' territorial autonomy
over their own property. The opinions of Vaup,6s, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd
were written by different Justices and the cases were decided by very
different panels.92 However, in all of them, the main argument that
justified the Court's holdings included an appeal to property. For the
Justices, the use of a category, so rooted in our legal and political tradition,
made them feel that their interpretations were sound and that they would
not be politically questioned by the government, Congress, or public
opinion.
Military Base on the one hand, and Vaupis, Embera, U'wa, and Urrd,
on the other, synthesize two very different solutions to the conflict
between political unity and aboriginal groups' self-government rights at

92. Vaupis, was unanimously decided by Justices Alejandro Martfnez, Fabio Mor6n, and
Vladimiro Naranjo. Justice Martfnez wrote the opinion of the Court. The opinion of Embera was
written by Justice Cifuentes. The panel that decided the case was also formed by Justices Martfnez
Caballero and Hernndez. U'wa was decided by the Court's nine Justices since it was a Unification
Opinion case. Six Justices agreed with the opinion written by Justice Barrera. Justices Herrera,
Naranjo, and Mor6n disagreed. The opinion of Urrd was written by Justice Gaviria. Justices
Hernndez and Betancur were also part of the panel that decided this case.
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the core of the 1991 Colombian Constitution. While Military Base is
identified with legal and political centralism, Vaupds, Embera, U'wa, and
Urrd are identified with political autonomy. While the former holding is
committed to a country in which all the fundamental legal and political
decisions are made in the center, the latter are committed to giving
aboriginal groups enough space to allow them to regulate their private and
public life through their uses and customs.
In MilitaryBase's militant centralism, there is a vertical conception of
the distribution of political and legal power. The capacity to create law is
concentrated in national legislative and administrative institutions.
Provincial, local, and special jurisdictions (like aboriginal groups') have
impartial residual powers to create legal norms.
At best, these jurisdictions can create juridical rules that adapt national
legal norms to the particularities of their jurisdictions. Generally, it is
understood that they are just in charge of enforcing the decisions made in
the center. Militant centralism is not a new conception of the state in
Colombia.
This has clear roots in the Spanish colony and in the strong influence
that French public law has had in the country for more than a century. We
can fully comprehend its continuing normative power (and weaknesses)
if it is seen as a theoretical and practical weapon used by liberals in
eighteenth and nineteenth century France to fight the ancien rggime. This
was a powerful instrument to battle aristocratic privileges, the
capriciousness of the king's will, and the jurisdictional disorder inherited
from feudal times.
For the French, Spanish, and Colombian legal and political traditions,
centralism is associated with important values like equality, juridical
security, government responsibility, and order. Centralization of the power
to create law implies that the norms created at the national level will be
equally applicable to all citizens. The legal rules enacted by Congress and
the President have a general and abstract character that respects the
equality of all citizens. No particular rules can be created; no special
privileges or obligations for distinct groups of persons can be enacted.
Similarly, centralism allows citizens to know easily and clearly what
are their rights and obligations. In principle, all legal rules created by
Congress and by the executive power will be applicable indefinitely to all
citizens. There are no overlapping jurisdictions with a variety of
(sometimes contradictory) legal rules determining citizens' rights and
burdens.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2005

57

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 6

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Vol. 17

Equally important for the French, Spanish, and Colombian legal and
political traditions, is that centralism clearly specifies that only a few
national institutions have the right to create law. This feature of a
centralized political system allows an easy identification of state
institutions' obligations and responsibilities. If there is a failure in the
system, for example, corruption or negligence, it is easy to determine those
responsible, and to apply the measures needed to correct it. Finally,
militant centralism determines a clear chain of command, guaranteeing
order in the political system.
Vaupgs's, Embera's, U'wa's, and Urrd'sradical collective autonomy,
in contrast, is a new political and legal perspective in Colombia. Its origin
does not go very far back in the history of the country. The earliest traces
of radical collective autonomy can be found in the wide political
movement that, during the 1980s, pushed for the decentralization of
Colombia's political system. The main result of this political perspective
was the 1986 constitutional reform that allowed the popular election of
mayors and governors (before they were all appointed by the president).
Yet, it was only in the 1991 Constitutional National Assembly that the
possibility of granting wide political autonomy rights to aboriginal
communities was initially discussed.93 In the 1991 Colombian
Constitution, for the first time in the history of the country, its
multicultural character was seen as something valuable, rather than as a
historical burden to be destroyed.

93. Law 89 of 1889 gave aboriginal communities a very limited political autonomy to judge
the violation of moral rules by their members. However, all laws created by Congress and the
executive power were applicable to Indian tribes. Moreover, this residual autonomy was thought
to be a temporal entitlement while missions achieved their duty to transform all aboriginal groups
into Christian Spanish speakers.
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